The District of Columbia Mayor’s Focused Improvement Area Initiative: Review of the Literature Relevant to Collaborative Crime Reduction

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The District of Columbia Crime Policy Institute (DCPI) was established at the Urban Institute in collaboration with the Brookings Institution, through the jointly administered Partnership for Greater Washington Research with funding from the Justice Grants Administration in the Executive Office of the Mayor. DCPI is a nonpartisan, public policy research organization focused on crime and justice policy in Washington, DC. DCPI’s mission is to support improvements in the administration of justice policy through evidence-based research. An assessment of the Mayor’s Focused Improvement Areas (FIA) Initiative is one of DCPI’s three original research projects in FY2010. For more information on DCPI, see http://www.dccrimepolicy.org

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Acronyms

**BBBSA**  Big Brothers Big Sisters of America

**BGCA**  Boys and Girls Clubs of America

**BRI**  Boston Reentry Initiative

**CAR**  Children at Risk

**CCI**  Comprehensive Community Initiative

**CGP**  Comprehensive Gang Program

**COPS**  Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services

**CPVP**  Chicago Project for Violence Prevention

**CTC**  Communities that Care

**DCPI**  District of Columbia Crime Policy Institute

**DMI**  Drug Market Intervention

**FFT**  Functional Family Therapy

**FIA**  Focused Improvement Areas

**GREAT**  Gang Resistance Education and Training

**GRP**  Gang Reduction Program

**MST**  Multi-Systemic Therapy

**NJI**  Neighborhood Jobs Initiative

**OJJDP**  Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

**OJP**  Office of Justice Programs

**PSN**  Project Safe Neighborhoods

**SACSI**  Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative

**SARA**  Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment

**SRO**  School Resource Officer

**SVORI**  Serious and Violent Offender Reentry Initiative
Introducing

In March 2010, the Executive Office of the Mayor/Office of the City Administrator asked the District of Columbia Crime Policy Institute (DCPI) to assess the Mayor’s Focused Improvement Area Initiative. The Focused Improvement Area (FIA) Initiative, launched in November 2007, is a community-based initiative that aims to reduce criminal activity and increase the quality of life in at-risk communities by combining community policing with human and social services delivery. In an effort to make recommendations on how to strengthen the FIA Initiative, DCPI conducted an assessment based on:

- Interviews with the Initiative’s stakeholders—past and present—on the Initiative’s mission and background, design, and actual implementation;
- Reviews of programmatic materials and administrative records and field observations of the Initiative’s processes and procedures; and
- An exhaustive review of the theoretical and empirical literature on best and promising practices in crime reduction, prevention, and suppression strategies and effective comprehensive community initiatives.

Based on the assessment, DCPI has produced three documents to help guide District stakeholders on a redesign of the FIA Initiative, including:

- An examination of past challenges and successes;¹
- A review of research literature relevant to collaborative crime reduction; and
- A strategic plan to guide future efforts.²

This document summarizes the results of a literature review on multifaceted approaches to reducing crime and improving neighborhoods; in other words, of literature on efforts like the District’s FIA Initiative. To that end, this literature review focused on efforts that were intended to produce community-level impacts, involved multiple approaches, and were carried out by partnerships spanning agency boundaries. The literature review focused further on two major categories of interventions: 1) those focused on reducing or preventing crime and, 2) those with broader goals of improving neighborhoods or resident well-being, sometimes called “Comprehensive Community Initiatives” (CCIs). Both types of interventions are place-based and intended to improve neighborhoods, but they usually involve different public agencies, funding

sources, and community-based organizations with diverse missions. While the two sets of interventions share the broad goal of improving distressed neighborhoods, their specific goals usually do not overlap.

Crime prevention/reduction efforts typically focus on reducing homicides, arrests, gang activity, or other public safety indicators. Activities to improve other measures of well-being such as school attendance or employment are typically subordinate to the crime prevention efforts and are not tracked as closely. Meanwhile, comprehensive community initiatives or other place-based efforts focused on employment, economic development, or housing may expect reduced crime as an indirect benefit, but do not generally target activities specifically towards crime reduction, and if they do, it is a subordinate activity. (Please see section 3.2 for a fuller discussion of the nature of CCIs.) While many sections of this document focus on crime-reduction efforts, lessons from CCIs and other community initiatives are incorporated as relevant.

For public safety interventions, this literature review is based on evaluations indicating that crime reduction/prevention efforts produced targeted outcomes in at least one location in which they were implemented. The review of the public safety literature sought to determine which aspects of existing violence or crime prevention programs were successful. Because the goals and activities of CCIs and other broad neighborhood improvement efforts focused on social services or physical revitalization are so varied, it is notoriously difficult to structure evaluations and draw conclusions about what works in the field. Therefore, this review pulls from information on specific CCIs as well as state-of-the-field assessments to highlight what such initiatives can and cannot accomplish and what structures and actions are most effective. This literature review was not designed to rank intervention programs in general, since extant research thoroughly documents best and promising practices in public safety and prevention. However, this document does pull out and highlight lessons for policy and practice in the District, aligned with the study team’s recommendations for moving forward in the strategic plan.

The literature review is divided into two broad sections. The first covers programmatic elements of initiatives: the strategies, interventions, and activities that successful efforts have employed. The second section covers process and structural elements, with subsections devoted to interagency collaboration, community engagement, and sustainability. Evaluations consistently find that how a collaborative effort structures itself and carries out its work is as important to its success as what programs or activities it uses. This insight is reflected throughout this review, both in the elevation of structural elements as a subject for consideration in their own right, and in discussion of implementation practices in the tactical elements section.

Several challenges encountered in summarizing the literature in this way should be noted. Research on collaborative crime- and violence-reduction initiatives varies considerably in attention paid to anything other than overall outcomes. The importance of partnership design elements is often slighted, and the contribution of specific elements of multipronged approaches may not be discussed. Even when specific elements are discussed, there may be little detail regarding what specific models were used. For example, an evaluation may state that an initiative provided case management without specifying what model was used, how large caseloads were, whether formal case plans were created, or any number of details that would be useful to a practitioner seeking to replicate the approach. As Roehl et al. write about the SACSI sites, “The list of prevention/intervention services provided through SACSI is long, and includes” Summary descriptions and lists were common, since a variety of different programs implemented at different levels were involved in these comprehensive programs.

Perhaps most importantly, it is difficult to discuss the various models and approaches discussed in this literature review due to the way that they evolved from or were informed by one another. For example, Irving Spergel’s Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project gave rise to what is generally known as the “Spergel Model,” which was replicated in multiple sites to varying degrees of success, and became the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP)’s Comprehensive Gang Model. In addition,

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3See, for example, the University of Colorado’s Blueprints for Violence Prevention, which has assessed over 800 programs (http://www.colorado.edu/cspv/blueprints/) and Lum, Koper, and Telep’s Evidence-Based Policing Matrix (http://gunston.gmu.edu/cebcp/Matrix.html).
some programs, such as Weed and Seed and Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), tend to work in concert when present in the same communities because of the shared goals and objectives.

Past research on collaborative efforts to reduce crime and improve communities contains a multitude of valuable lessons. The key lessons that are supported across several sources are summarized in table 1.1. For a quick summary of the crime prevention and reduction initiatives discussed frequently in this literature review, see summary tables 2.1 and 2.2. Detail on the initiatives and sources used for this review are included in the annotated bibliography.
Table 1.1: Key Lessons for Policy and Practice

- Project goals must be rigorously assessed against the resources and support necessary to implement them. If the partnership lacks the capacity to accomplish the goals, the goals must be adjusted or investments must be made to increase capacity.
- Carefully define the dynamics of the problem using data and the front-line knowledge of practitioners, and be open to revising the problem definition. For example, Boston Ceasefire initially attributes an outbreak of youth homicides to the widespread availability of guns, but after further analysis, attributed it to conflicts among a small subset of gang-involved youth.
- Swiftness and certainty of sanctions for criminal behavior is more effective in deterring potential offenders than severity of the sanction. With limited justice system resources, bringing swiftness and severity to bear to deliver deterrence entails two design principles: concentration of resources and direct communication of deterrent threats to likely offenders.
- When working with gang members or active offenders, it is extremely important to balance crime suppression activities with interventions to reduce or prevent criminal activity, such as services related to education, substance abuse, and counseling. Balancing suppression and intervention is challenging, as criminal justice agencies are accustomed to working together on clearly defined suppression activities (arrest, prosecution, and so on), and often able to collaborate more quickly on suppression activities than those working on intervention/prevention activities.
- Different subpopulations will respond to different intervention activities, or levels of service intensity. Age, degree of gang involvement, and presence of specific risk factors and protective factors are among the relevant differences.
- Outreach workers can be very effective in connecting to and engaging offenders and at-risk youth, particularly if they share common experiences with the target population. Outreach work can bring challenges, such as tensions with law enforcement if they are perceived as too close to those engaged in criminal activity, and burnout and turnover due to low pay, long hours, and intense work.
- Many human services objectives require an integrated human services partnership capable of delivering multiple interventions. For example, assisting individuals with getting and keeping jobs can involve helping them overcome the reluctance of employers to hire people with criminal records, securing other assistance in order to work (such as child care or earnings supplements, especially in the case of low-wage jobs), improving their education level and skills, or leading with other interventions to address issues such as addiction, mental illness, or anti-social attitudes.
- Interagency collaboration is critically important but can take years and serious commitment to achieve. It requires dedicated staff, relationship building, and openness to different ways of doing things.
- Sustaining initiatives requires securing sufficient resources, collecting evaluation data to substantiate success and make mid-course corrections, spreading leadership and institutionalizing organizational structures to create resiliency in the face of staff turnover, and building and maintaining community support. In the absence of some or all of these factors, even successful initiatives have been discontinued.
Programmatic Elements

This section of the review focuses on the individual tactics and activities employed by successful initiatives to reduce crime and violence (with lessons from efforts targeting other community-level issues incorporated as appropriate). Separate subsections are allotted to Crime and Violence Intervention and Targeted Prevention below. Distinguishing between the two is useful because the former is an attempt to deliver an immediate response to acute violence or crime problems, whereas the latter is often premised on the understanding that many social problems are inter-related, including poverty, neighborhood physical and social disorder, lack of prosocial recreational activities, educational failure, unemployment, substance abuse, mental health, and crime and violence. Accordingly, immediate crime and violence intervention and targeted prevention differ in the breadth of issues they attempt to address, their approach to targeting, and their time horizons for realizing success. Treating them separately in this review makes it possible to summarize the knowledge and lessons learned applicable to each in a way that recognizes those distinctions.

The reality is that many anti-crime and violence initiatives engage in activities of both kinds, and this is particularly true for comprehensive initiatives. In the interest of clarity, however, this review discusses program elements in the context of either crime and violence intervention or targeted prevention.

2.1. CRIME AND VIOLENCE INTERVENTION

This subsection discusses activities directed at reducing targeted crime and violence in the immediate term, primarily involving a combination of suppression to directly interrupt and deter offending, and intervention to promote desistance. The distinction made between these interventions and targeted prevention efforts is consistent with that in the FIA strategic plan.

2.1.1. PROBLEM ANALYSIS

A strategy to reduce crime and violence is unlikely to be effective unless it addresses the drivers of the crime and violence problems in an area. It follows that a structured process to identify and understand those drivers is a necessary step in crafting an effective intervention. For that reason, most models for collaborative anti-crime initiatives emphasize a problem analysis process that draws upon data analysis and practitioner knowledge to rigorously define the dynamics of the problem. The problem analysis component of community policing is defined in terms of the SARA Model, consisting of Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment (COPS 2009). The SARA Model has been incorporated into many collaborative initiatives against crime, including the Strategic Approach to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI). The SARA model
requires police agencies to work with community members to identify and prioritize problems in specific neighborhoods (Scanning). They then research the problem to understand its specific dynamics (Analysis) and develop strategies that will eliminate or substantially reduce the problem permanently (Response). Evaluating the success of these response strategies is the final step in the model (Assessment).

An excellent example of the value of a robust problem analysis process leading to development of an appropriate response comes from Boston Ceasefire (Kennedy, Braga, and Piehl 2001). The partnership brought researchers from Harvard University into a working group with practitioners to address the soaring youth homicide rate in Boston. The researchers believed that youth homicides were the result of widespread gun availability and fear among young people in Boston, but practitioners on the working group close to the streets (including streetworkers and probation officers) insisted that the issue was conflict among a small sub-set of gang-involved youth. The group undertook a number of problem analysis activities, including analysis of a dataset containing 1,550 guns recovered from individuals under the age of 21 (including type, age, and origin of recovered guns) and reviews of available data on the 155 youth homicide victims and 125 identified perpetrators from the previous five years. Participants engaged in an effort to systematically detail gang size, turf and membership in Boston, as well as mapping active and latent conflicts among the identified groups. The 155 youth homicides were reviewed in light of this analysis, and 60 percent were found to be gang-related, with the majority related to feuds, as opposed to being related to “business” (e.g. drug trafficking) (Kennedy, Braga, and Piehl 2001). "None of these dimensions-the number of crews, their size, their relationships, or the connection of gangs and gang rivalries to homicide-could have been examined from formal records. . . But the frontline practitioners. . . had this knowledge" (Kennedy, Braga, and Piehl 2001, 23). Acting on this understanding of the youth homicide problem in Boston, the participants developed the group-based focused deterrence approach that was the backbone of the Ceasefire strategy.

Drawing from this experience, SACSI was built around the idea of replicating the planning process that lead to the development of Ceasefire in Boston, rather than replicating its specific activities (Coldren et al. 2002). Specifically, SACSI focused on enhancing analytic capacity in participating sites through increasing access to data, increasing the usefulness of that data, and using geographical information systems (GIS) to enhance the power of the data (Groff, Fleury, and Stoe 2000). The SACSI model also involved the inclusion of researchers on the SACSI team to contribute to the problem analysis process, an element common to Boston Ceasefire, Chicago CeaseFire, Little Village, Chicago PSN, and many other successful initiatives.

Implementation experiences in the five Phase I SACSI sites indicate the difficulty of getting jurisdictions to work through this analysis process when successful models from other places are available. Most of the SACSI Phase I sites adopted components of the Boston Ceasefire strategy without considering whether that strategy was a good fit for the dynamics in their communities (Coldren et al. 2002). For example, Indianapolis found that gangs there were not as cohesive as in Boston, which reduced the effectiveness of the generalized deterrence elements of the Boston Ceasefire approach.

However, Coldren et al. (2002) found that sites began to follow the SACSI model more closely over time, and learned to develop program strategies based on the local context. A systematic review team for homicides or other incidents of interest to the partnership, which involved street workers, project leadership, and researchers, was "one of the most successful problem analysis tools in half of the SACSI sites” (Roehl et al. 2008, 9). OJJDP (2008) also included a problem analysis component in its Comprehensive Gang Model, advocating a data-driven approach to comprehensively assess the gang problem in a community, and used the results of that assessment to create a strategic plan. Analysis can also assist with determining the resources that can be employed by an initiative. The Chicago PSN taskforce requested local and federal prosecutors to review every gun case in the City of Chicago to determine which jurisdiction could get the longest sentence for those with previous gun violence in the target area (Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan 2007).

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1In this review, we distinguish between Boston Ceasefire and Chicago CeaseFire, because although they share many operational elements, Chicago CeaseFire draws from public health concepts in a way that Boston Ceasefire does not, and some operational differences follow from that.
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The literature reviewed strongly emphasizes the importance of engaging in a problem analysis process in order to carefully define the dynamics of the crime problem of interest using data and the front-line knowledge of practitioners. The partnership should also be open to revising the problem definition in light of the information it collects. This is necessary because the drivers of the problem may be different from what was initially assumed (by some or all of the partners), and because a greater understanding of the problem may suggest innovative solutions. Failure to engage in problem analysis could lead to the adoption of strategies that do not fit the circumstances of the neighborhoods in which they are applied, making them less effective.

2.1.2. Targeting the Intervention

Defining the target for the crime and violence intervention provides clarity and focus for the effort. Targeting in this context is of two kinds: geographical and individual. Geographical targeting is the decision regarding where the interventions should occur. Many initiatives used a two-level targeting strategy: targeting a certain area, and then targeting a certain group within the area. Examples of targeted areas may include neighborhoods with the highest gang incidents or highest violent crimes rates; examples of targeted groups might include violent gang members or chronic violent offenders (those at the highest risk of gun related violence). The Chicago PSN evaluation emphasized that, while a police department might be the lead agency for this component, determining the areas, groups, and individuals to target should be a collaborative effort involving the steering committee and/or case management team. Such approaches are consistent with a community policing orientation (Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan 2007).

The evaluation of the multisite Gang Reduction Program found that targeting areas with significant gang problems and preexisting knowledge regarding gang issues provides the greatest value (Cahill et al. 2008). While this seems intuitive, it can be a challenge to bring about in real-world circumstances. Chicago CeaseFire’s reliance on funding from local government for field operations, and the political considerations that came with it, resulted in a perceived negative effect on its ability to target the neighborhoods most in need of the intervention (Skogan et al. 2008). The result was some program sites were chosen due to the severity of the violence problem, and others selected at the urging of local politicians and policymakers.
Individual-targeting is the determination of who the program should engage in interventions in order to affect crime and violence. A cross-site analysis of the importance of implementing the various elements of the Comprehensive Gang Model found that targeting gang members/at-risk youth was “extremely important” (Spergel, Wå, and Sosa 2006). Note that this targeting blends crime and violence intervention (current gang members) and targeted prevention (at-risk youth) purposes. The cross-site evaluation of Weed and Seed concluded that sites focusing resources on specific smaller populations were more successful (Dunworth et al. 1999a). Focused deterrence efforts such as Boston Ceasefire and the High Point Drug Market Intervention (DMI) need to zero in on a clearly defined target population by definition (see Kennedy, Braga, and Piehl 2001; Kennedy and Wong 2009). In the Ceasefire context, this means all youth affiliated with gangs involved in shootings. In the DMI context, it means all drug dealers selling in an identified market.

Targeting might also take into consideration the possibility of differential impact of interventions within the overall population served. In Mesa, youth with more priors did well with higher levels of service; those with fewer priors did well with less (Spergel, Wå, and Sosa 2002). In Little Village, suppression activity was more effective with older, violent, and gang-affiliated youth, whereas outreach workers were more effective with younger, less-violent youth (Spergel 2007).

In sum, the lessons from the crime and violence intervention literature are two-fold. First, clearly defining the area and individuals being targeted is more effective than not doing so. Second, different approaches (or different elements of a comprehensive approach) may be more or less effective with different subpopulations of interest. Attending to these issues is an important task of the problem analysis.

2.1.3. Community Policing

As defined by the Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services (COPS 2009), community-policing consists of three elements:

- Development of collaborative community partnerships, including with other government agencies, community groups and members, non-profits, service providers, private business, and the media
- Organizational transformation to support community partnerships and proactive problem solving
- Engagement in problem-solving activity oriented around the SARA Model

Defined in this way, community policing strategies dovetail with the problem analysis and targeting components already discussed.

Community policing is a popular policing strategy in communities in general and in many of the effective initiatives discussed in this review specifically. In Weed and Seed sites, community policing was important for both community engagement and problem solving. This program element was intended to instill a sense of responsibility in residents about crime prevention while simultaneously building rapport between citizens and law enforcement. Although Boston Ceasefire and its successors do not explicitly incorporate community policing, the problem solving approach of community policing is found in SACSI strategies (Roehl et al. 2006) and the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) is an official partner of the PSN program (http://www.psn.gov/partners/index.html).

A review of the crime control effects of various policing approaches found that community policing reduces the fear of crime, but without problem-oriented policing strategies, it does not consistently reduce crime or disorder (Weisburd and Eck 2004). Of course, if one accepts the definition of community policing offered by the COPS Office, without problem-oriented policing strategies, an effort cannot be said to be community policing (but one could have a problem-oriented policing strategy that did not entail partnership with the community). A Campbell Collaboration systematic review of problem-oriented policing efforts concluded that problem-oriented policing is effective in reducing crime and disorder, but that the effect is fairly modest (Weisburd et al. 2008).
In their review of policing practices, Weisburd and Eck (2004) also note the variety of activities associated with community policing (foot patrol, community meetings, storefront offices, newsletters) and changes in their prevalence as community policing has evolved. This makes it difficult to determine whether any two jurisdictions asserting that they are engaged in community policing are doing the same or similar things. Further complicating things, the terms community policing and problem-solving or problem-oriented policing tend to be used interchangeably. Both can perhaps best be understood in terms of what they are not: the traditional reactive policing approach that relies on routinized patrol and responses to calls for service.

Weisburd and Eck’s review of the evidence on the effects of policing practices does not include information on how community policing strategies affect the perception of the police by the community (and vice versa). Presumably, if community policing efforts result in community members having better relations with the community, this would result in greater cooperation with the police, including greater willingness to provide information. Hawdon, Ryan, and Griffin (2003) found that increased police visibility related to community policing approaches increased resident satisfaction with and trust in police, although it did not appear that direct contact with police necessarily had any effect. The authors did note that police treating residents with respect is important in establishing trust in the police, and that having officers treat residents with respect is a central tenant of community policing efforts. Police visibility in neighborhoods is the product of management decisions, whereas the degree to which community policing results in officers treating residents with more respect depends on the degree to which they buy in to community policing principles.

2.1.4. Suppression

Suppression activities, usually led by police departments, direct criminal justice system resources to interrupt or reduce targeted criminal activities. Suppression is essentially the more intensive, concentrated, and frequently collaborative application of routine criminal justice system activities such as police patrol, arrest, prosecution, probation/parole surveillance, and revocation, focused on targeted individuals, locations or activities. Spergel, Wa, and Sosa (2006) found suppression “extremely important” in their exploration of factors related to differential success across Comprehensive Gang Model implementation sites. In Little Village, suppression activities, especially involving police, reduced gang membership status. As already noted, this suppression activity was more effective with older, violent, and gang-affiliated youth and less so with younger, less gang-involved youth (Spergel 2007). Targeting of guns is also a popular suppression strategy, and has been effective. Chicago PSN found that gun seizures that were coordinated with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) correlated with declines in police beat rates of gun homicide rates (Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan 2007).

Suppression activity is a core component of the vast majority of the public safety interventions examined for this review. Suppression activities alone, however, do not appear to be very effective. Studies of broadly applied intensive enforcement and arrests found generally negative results (Weisburd and Eck 2004). Because suppression activities involve intensive use of criminal justice system resources, it is difficult for the criminal justice system to maintain them on an ongoing basis, even where they have proven successful (Kleiman 2009). This reality has led practitioners to pursue two operational avenues (which are not mutually exclusive). Focused deterrence strategies, which this review discusses next, address the limitations of broad suppression activities by structuring interventions to make more strategic and parsimonious use of criminal justice system resources to realize reductions in crime and violence. Many effective initiatives discussed in this review pair suppression strategies with interventions to solidify gains made, with the Weed and Seed project (with the former referring to suppression elements and the latter to intervention elements) most explicitly based on this logic. As will be discussed later in this review, the optimal balance between suppression and other program elements can be difficult to achieve in practice.
Most criminal justice system activities are theoretically intended to deter criminal behavior. Research indicates that swiftness and certainty of sanctions for criminal behavior is more effective in deterring potential offenders than is severity of the sanction. In a situation in which justice system resources are limited, bringing swiftness and severity to bear to deliver deterrence entails two design principles: concentration of resources and direct communication of deterrent threats to likely offenders (Kleiman 2009). This brings focus to deterrence activities.

Boston Ceasefire and its successors exemplify the focused deterrence approach. Through the problem-analysis process previously discussed, the Ceasefire collaborative found that a small number of youth gang members involved in inter-gang conflicts could be linked to the vast majority of the youth homicides in the city (Kennedy, Braga, and Piehl 2001). Key players in these conflicts were identified, and the Ceasefire team brought them into notification (or “call-in”) meetings to deliver an explicit message that their violent behavior would no longer be tolerated. In the event that further shootings associated with a gang occurred, the criminal justice partners in Boston Ceasefire would “pull every lever” (including federal prosecution, serving outstanding warrants, and intensifying or revoking parole/probation supervision) to take that gang down. Thus, Boston Ceasefire was built on both concentration of resources and direct communication of deterrent threat (there were also “carrots” to go along with the “stick,” as will be covered subsequently). At the outset of the Ceasefire intervention, in response to continued violence after a notification meeting, 23 members of the Intervale Posse (a violent gang in Boston) were indicted on federal or state charges (Kennedy, Braga, and Piehl 2001). The lessons from Intervale were incorporated into subsequent notification activities with other groups.

Although some researchers are skeptical of Ceasefire’s actual impact on homicide rates (see Rosenfeld, Fornango, and Baumer 2005; Wellford, Pepper, and Petrie 2004), Ceasefire has received generally positive reviews. Specifically, Braga et al. (2001b) found a significant reduction in the number of youth homicides (63 percent decrease), monthly shots fired (32 percent decrease), and gun assaults (25 percent decrease) in Boston compared to the percentages in other U.S. cities. Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) was initiated in 2001 and incorporated the focused deterrence principles used in Boston Ceasefire. Using Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models in a national comparison of PSN cities (n = 82) and non-PSN cities (n = 170), McGarrell et al. (2010) found that cities that implemented PSN had modest but significant reductions in violent crime (compared to stable violent crime rates in the treatment groups). Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan (2007) analyzed the relationship of specific elements of PSN in Chicago and found the percentage of offenders attending the forums (the Chicago PSN terminology for notification meetings) was the PSN element most strongly related to declining beat-level homicide rates - more than federal prosecutions and gun seizures.

The logic underlying Boston Ceasefire, and its successors was applied to the problem of open-air drug markets in High Point, North Carolina. The High Point intervention, which resulted in the Drug Market Intervention (DMI) model, targeted a drug market in the West End neighborhood, characterized by public drug dealing, drive-through buyers, and the associated issues of crime and disorder (Kennedy 2008). Call-in sessions (High Point’s version of Ceasefire’s notification meetings) brought dealers identified as primarily responsible for the drug market activity into a meeting with influential community members (including family members of the dealers) identified by caseworkers (Kennedy and Wong 2009). At the call-in session, the police and the District Attorney informed the dealers that they would be arrested that evening if they did not desist from the drug trade. If the dealers agreed, they were offered support from the community representatives.

The High Point intervention was judged successful - homicides declined from fifteen to two in 1999 (Dalton 2003), and overall crime in the West End (a target area) fell 57 percent over four years (Hipple et al. 2009). As a result, it was replicated in a number of jurisdictions. In Providence, the intervention had similar results-according to the researchers involved in the intervention, the targeted drug markets “vanished” one year
after the intervention (Kennedy and Wong 2009). In Rockford, the DMI was associated with reductions in both violent and non-violent crime, as well as nuisance offenses (Corsaro, Brunson, and McGarrell 2009). In Nashville, the intervention had a greater impact on the “non-lethal” crime associated with drug markets (Corsaro and McGarrell 2009). An evaluation of the New Hope Initiative in Winston-Salem, NC found that calls for service declined by 22 percent and UCR Part I crimes fell by 11.5 percent one year after the intervention, but all offenses increased 32.3 percent during the same time period and UCR Part I violent crime stayed the same (Harvey 2005). The general success of these DMI initiatives indicates that the Ceasefire-derived focused deterrence approach has applicability to crime problems other than gang- or crew-related homicide.

In summary, effective focused deterrence efforts require identification of the individuals or groups engaging in the targeted activity, devising a means to communicate the clear deterrent message to those targeted, and commitment to immediately sanction any further targeted criminal behavior.

2.1.6. Reentry Programs

The large numbers of individuals returning to low-income, high-crime neighborhoods are a large potential contributing factor to crime and disorder in those areas. Comprehensive reentry programs have been promoted in recent reports and studies as an effective strategy to encourage desistance from crime by addressing the multifaceted issues returning prisoners encounter (Lattimore 2007; Re-entry Policy Council 2005; Visher 2007). While some of the initiatives previously mentioned, such as the Gang Reduction Program (GRP) and Chicago PSN, pay attention to reentry as part of the intervention program component, other strategies have been specifically centered on reentry. One federally funded strategy, the Serious and Violent Offender Reentry Initiative (SVORI), provided comprehensive services to returning prisoners, including education, employment, medical care, and housing. In a 2009 impact evaluation of 12 adult and four juvenile sites (or 2,391 individuals), participants had increased levels of services received, although the number who needed services was still higher than the number who received services (Lattimore and Visher 2009). Results were disappointing overall; although substance use was lower for those receiving services and arrest rates were lower for females, program participants did not have significant improvements in drug use, reincarceration rates were not improved for men or women, and arrest rates for males did not improve. Lessons from SVORI include the need for full program implementation, the sustained effort needed for complex programs, and the challenges involved in identifying returning prisoners for the program (Lattimore and Visher 2009).

However, there are comprehensive reentry strategies with more promising outcomes (see Aos et al. 2006; Travis 2009). An example is the Boston Reentry Initiative (BRI), an interagency program that attempts to reduce recidivism rates by successfully integrating inmates returning into the community from the Suffolk County House of Corrections. Specifically, the BRI uses individualized service plans to provide social services and vocational training and works with program participants both during the individual’s incarceration and when the person is released from prison. Importantly, the BRI also targets a select group of returning prisoners - those at the highest risk of committing violent offenses after release - and through panel sessions that convene criminal justice practitioners, social service agencies, faith-based organizations, and new program participants, the message of opportunities for change, consequences for recidivism, and the interagency collaborations that comprise the program are conveyed. Using a quasi-experimental design and survival analyses, evaluators found significant decreases in both total and violent arrest failure rates for program participants (compared to a control group) (Braga, Piehl, and Hureau 2009).

In addition to interagency collaboration approaches, there have been promising strategies with community-based reentry programs as well. Using the community as an integral component of the reentry process, these programs connect community resources and organizations to those returning from prison in a more systematic way. Examples include the Maryland Reentry Partnership Initiative, which was linked to a
notable reduction in homicides (Roman et al. 2007), and the Safer Return initiative in Chicago, which is currently under evaluation by the Urban Institute.

Table 2.2: Prominent Comprehensive Gang Interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Summary of Program</th>
<th>Influential Participating Sites</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spergel/OJJDP model</td>
<td>Aims to reduce youth gang crime and violence and increase the community's ability to conduct prevention, suppression, and intervention through five main strategies: community mobilization, opportunities provision, social intervention, suppression, and organizational change.</td>
<td>Little Village</td>
<td>Program clients had significantly reduced overall violent crime and drug arrests compared to control youth receiving some or no services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Riverside</td>
<td>Compared to youth not receiving services, program youth had a reduction in arrest rates and self-reported offenses in several categories. Program was successful for gang involved youth and delinquent youth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mesa</td>
<td>Compared to youth not receiving services, program youth had a reduction in arrest rates and self-reported offenses in several categories. Youth-associated crime rates decreased by 10% in Mesa compared to average rates in three comparison areas and program youth had an 18% decrease in arrests over the four year period. Gang measures were not significant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bloomington-Normal, IL; San Antonio, TX; and Tucson, AZ</td>
<td>The sites without positive findings (Tucson, Bloomington, and San Antonio) were linked to weak implementation of the model (with many of the critical components missing), a lack of collaboration with other organizations, limited programs/services available to youth, and had a generalized (versus individualized) strategy across sites/youth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gang Reduction Program</td>
<td>Multi-year, multi-site OJJDP sponsored anti-gang comprehensive program.</td>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>The only successful site in 2008 evaluation of GRP. Serious violence, gang related incidents, gang-related serious violence, and reported shots fired were all reduced after the program was implemented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Milwaukee, North Miami Beach, and Richmond, VA</td>
<td>The Milwaukee and North Miami Beach sites did not have significant changes after GRP was implemented and Richmond had adverse changes after the GRP implementation. Reasons attributed to this include internal conflict, bureaucratic obstacles, and a lack of a unified vision (Milwaukee); a low initial level of gang activity and a focus on long-term outcomes that may not produce early findings (North Beach); and an unclearly defined problem, the lack of a unified vision for GRP among partners, and unfocused planning and service implementation (Richmond).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.1.7. Gang Interventions

The foundational gang intervention program is the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention’s (OJJDP) Comprehensive Gang Model, commonly known as the “Spergel Model.” The Comprehensive Gang
Model consists of five core strategies (OJJDP 2008):

- Community mobilization
- Opportunities provision
- Social intervention
- Suppression
- Organizational change and development

This model is derived from an intervention developed by Irving Spergel in Chicago’s Little Village neighborhood that produced significantly reduced overall violent crime and drug arrests for program clients, compared to those receiving some or those receiving no services, although the program did not impact total, property, or minor arrests (Spergel 2007). Replication of the Little Village intervention was funded by OJJDP in five sites (Bloomington-Normal, IL; San Antonio, TX; Mesa, AZ; Tucson, AZ; and Riverside, CA).

Evaluation of the Riverside intervention found that, compared to youth not receiving services, program youth had a reduction in arrest rates and self-reported offenses in several categories, and the program was not just successful for gang involved youth, but worked for delinquent youth as well (Spergel, Wa, and Sosa 2003). In Mesa, youth-associated crime rates decreased by 10 percent compared to the average rates in three comparison areas, and program youth had decreased arrests (by 18 percent) over the four year period (Spergel, Wa, and Sosa 2002). There was little evidence of effectiveness in Bloomington-Normal, San Antonio, and Tucson, however, likely due to low levels of implementation fidelity (Spergel, Wa, and Sosa 2006). Evidence regarding the importance of individual components of the model is included in the appropriate sections of this review.

An evaluation of OJJDP-funded Gang Reduction Program (GRP) activities in four sites found that only one site (Los Angeles) experienced a decrease in crime rates after GRP was implemented (Cahill et al. 2008). Specifically, serious violence, gang related incidents, gang-related serious violence, and reported shots fired were reduced in Los Angeles. GRP was an effort that integrated elements of the Spergel Model, PSN, and other activities underway within OJJDP (Cahill et al. 2008), and was part of the evolution of the Comprehensive Gang Model.

It is interesting to note that, unlike Spergel Model initiatives, Boston Ceasefire and its successors addressing group violence do not necessarily make desistance from gang membership a goal. Rather, they are targeting violence reduction, and the intervention logic is based on the possibility of using group cohesion to produce violence reduction. In this sense, the fact that gangs or crews are driving violence in some communities offers an intervention opportunity.

### 2.1.8. Criminal Justice—Human Services Collaborations

Human service provision plays a role in almost every successful crime-reduction effort covered in this review. In the crime and violence intervention context (as opposed to the targeted prevention context, where this review treats individual human service areas in more detail), the role of human service provision is perhaps best captured by the Comprehensive Gang Model’s idea of “opportunities provision” (OJJDP 2008). As suppression and focused deterrence decrease the attractiveness of criminal activity, services open a pathway to an alternative lifestyle, involving education, employment, sobriety, and healthy family functioning. In Boston Ceasefire, the portion of the notification meeting devoted to the intention of sanctioning further violence heavily was followed by gang outreach workers, social service providers, and clergy members offering their assistance and support to help individuals desist from crime and find legitimate employment (Kennedy, Braga, and Piehl 2001).

As discussed in the Gang Interventions section, clients receiving services in the Spergel Model sites were the ones with lower levels of offending. Evaluations of Ceasefire and its successors have not generally
examined the contribution of service provision to effectiveness, although the evaluation of the New Hope Initiative (Winston-Salem, NC’s DMI effort) found that service providers were able to link participants in the intervention to proper treatment, employment and educational resources (Harvey 2005). Kennedy (2010) is careful to note that in the Boston Ceasefire model, provision of services should not be presented as part of a transaction to secure desistance from violence. The partners in the initiative seek to help targeted offenders because they value them and want them to succeed, but their demand that violence stop is non-negotiable and not contingent upon successful service provision or assistance.

2.1.9.  Balancing and Sequencing Interventions

The implicit assumption underlying a comprehensive approach to crime (or any other) problems is that an array of coordinated activities will have greater success in bringing about desired outcomes than any single activity in isolation. Attempting to work from this premise, however, raises questions about the balancing and sequencing of these activities. In the context of comprehensive initiatives to address crime, this question is often framed in terms of how to combine suppression activities and intervention activities. A cross-site analysis of the importance of the implementing the various elements of the Comprehensive Gang Model found this balance of services to be “extremely important” (Spergel, Wa, and Sosa 2006). In the evaluation of Mesa’s implementation of the model, both too much suppression and too much social intervention had negative effects (Spergel, Wa, and Sosa 2005). Tita and Papachristos (2010; see also Howell 2010) present the consensus from reviews of anti-gang initiatives that it is a necessity of balancing suppression with intervention, yet efforts to do so often falter on poor design or poor implementation. Another reason may be that stakeholders engaged in suppression efforts, usually drawn from criminal justice agencies that have experience working together, are able to collaborate more quickly and effectively than those working on intervention elements. This was found to be the case in the Gang Reduction Program sites (Cahill et al. 2008).

Weed and Seed (with the former referring to suppression elements and the latter to intervention elements) was one of the most explicit attempts to date to design approaches that thought through the balance of these elements carefully. The cross-site evaluation of Weed and Seed concluded that successful sites balanced weeding and seeding. The order was important, with the evaluators suggesting early seeding, and sustained weeding (Dunworth and Mills 1999). Specifically, Weed and Seed sites found it was beneficial to implement quality of life improvement projects and other community initiatives before beginning intensive crime reduction campaigns (Booth and Crouter 2001). Taking a strategic approach to balancing and sequencing interventions requires close coordination and attention from all the collaborators on an initiative.

2.2.  TARGETED PREVENTION

Consistent with the FIA Strategic Plan, this review treats separately activities directed at reducing targeted crime and violence in the immediate term and those oriented toward prevention of future offending. This section addresses the literature on the latter type of work.

2.2.1.  Neighborhood Analysis and Identifying the Target Population

The Crime and Violence Intervention section laid out findings on the value of activities that zero in on a small number of individuals. By its nature, prevention activity must engage a larger pool of people, those who are at risk of committing future offenses (and who are often also at risk of being victims of future offenses). Prevention activities target behaviors that may be precursors or predictors of future crime and criminal behavior, which again will have a broadening effect relative to crime and violence interventions. In other words, the number of people involved in current criminal behavior of interest (such as gun violence) is likely
to be smaller than those at risk of problematic behavior in the future (such as chronic truants). Determining preventative strategies therefore requires a different approach than the problem analysis activity already described.

The Communities that Care (CTC) system directs participating communities to assess both predictors of problem behaviors and positive youth outcomes, as well as risk and protective factors identified in research. Predictors are then prioritized and a slate of proven programs and practices are matched to the community’s priorities (Hawkins and Catalano 2005). Because preventative activities can face even greater resources challenges than crime and violence interventions, it is also important to determine the resource environment of the community. For this reason, the Comprehensive Gang Model includes the conduct of an inventory of human and financial resources in the community, and creation of plans to fill gaps and leverage existing resources (OJJDP 2008).

The outcome of a neighborhood assessment like the one done in CTC will be a list of target issues to pursue, which will lead to the identification of the people toward whom prevention activity will be directed. Doing this well is vital to success. As noted in the Crime and Violence Intervention section, a cross-site analysis of the importance of implementing the various elements of the Comprehensive Gang Model found that targeting of gang members/at-risk youth was “extremely important” (Spergel, Wa, and Sosa 2006). This initiative targeted both current gang members (crime and violence intervention) and those at risk of becoming gang members (prevention). Drawing upon lessons learned from the Mesa anti-gang initiative, even the amount of service provision should vary, with those with more extensive criminal histories receiving more intensive services than individuals with less extensive criminal records (Spergel, Wa, and Sosa 2002).

Another method of targeting the intervention is by institutional involvement. For example, the Mesa implementation of the Comprehensive Gang Model targeted two junior high schools. The evaluation of the effort found that the program was more effective for youth who resided in the target area (Spergel, Wa, and Sosa 2002). This suggests that any jurisdiction considering an institution-based method of identifying the target population should consider the interplay between institutional catchment area and residence in the target neighborhood.

2.2.2. Outreach

Many prevention initiatives included in this review engaged in outreach activities and strategies to identify, contact, and engage offenders and at-risk youth in services to divert them from future offending. In those initiatives, outreach workers typically engaged with youth on the street one-on-one, determining eligibility, developing needs assessments, and connecting youth to resources. They were also often charged with maintaining communication with local groups and neighborhood residents. In communities that already have these outreach workers in place, they can serve as key informants in successfully identifying target populations and groups, and understanding dynamics within them. This was the case with gang streetworkers in Boston Ceasefire (Kennedy, Braga, and Piehl 2001).

Outreach workers played a key role in Comprehensive Gang Program (CGP) implementation. Along with counseling, outreach was a key direct service component of the Riverside CGP (Spergel, Wa, and Sosa 2003), although in the cross-site analysis of the CGP programs, Spergel, Wa, and Sosa (2006) found social intervention (outreach and crisis intervention) “moderately important.” In the Spergel Model, an intervention team is a vehicle to conduct outreach and provide services and referral to gang-involved youth. All the core agencies should have a member on the intervention team. Perhaps the most nuanced finding from that suite of interventions came from Little Village, and indicated that outreach was effective with younger, less violent gang-affiliated youth (Spergel 2007).

Chicago CeaseFire hired streetworkers (their term for outreach workers) to conduct outreach. The streetworkers were the key to identifying and providing counseling and services, which “may have been the most
successful element of the program” (Skogan et al. 2008). These streetworkers carried caseloads (the expectation was fifteen clients), spent most of their time outside the office, and acted much like case managers, although they did not have much training. Streetworkers kept clients engaged with CeaseFire (73 percent of surveyed clients reported weekly or more frequent contact with their streetworker), and served as mentors, counselors, mediators, and conduits to services. Outreach workers with past experiences in common with the target population, including status as an ex-offender, may be more effective in establishing rapport and credibility with clients. Chicago CeaseFire was challenged in finding a balance for streetworkers who would have credibility on the streets, often involving hiring ex-offenders. On occasion, this resulted in streetworkers who still had some engagement in illegal activity. Organizational capacity issues among local community organizations operating CeaseFire in the neighborhoods exacerbated this problem. Perceptions that workers engaged in outreach are possibly inappropriately close to criminal or gang activity could lead to a reluctance on the part of police to share information with them, as was the case in Mesa (Spergel, Wa, and Sosa 2002).

At the same time, the closeness of outreach workers to the dynamics on the streets and the individuals involved in the crime problems of interest can be an invaluable resource. In SACSI sites that incorporated street workers into outreach efforts, two key benefits resulted (Coldren et al. 2002). First, they brought a different and valuable perspective to the SACSI team deliberations. Second, more information became available for planning, monitoring, and local assessment.

Violence interrupters are a specialized form of outreach, and are an important component of Chicago’s CeaseFire program. Chicago CeaseFire is based on public health theories regarding how a number of inputs, including community norms regarding violence, result in the “transmission” of violence (Skogan et al. 2008). Chicago CeaseFire utilizes violence interrupters to mediate potentially violent conflicts that are part of processes or retaliation and retribution. Specifically, violence interrupters speak with gang leaders one-on-one, mediate gang-related conflicts, prevent retaliation, and provide counseling. Like any outreach, violence interruption activity depends on the interrupters being present on the streets and having good relationships and open communication with at-risk individuals. They need this to learn quickly about developing situations that might involve violent retaliation, to know with whom they need to intervene, and to have the credibility to dissuade people from committing further violence. This activity is difficult to evaluate (especially due to the unpredictable response needed for a crisis or violent situation), so effectiveness was more difficult for program evaluators to gauge than other elements of Chicago CeaseFire. Overall, program evaluators found that four of the seven hotspots in Chicago had a decrease in the number and intensity of shootings, with six of the seven hotspots being “noticeably safer” after the program was implemented (Skogan et al. 2008).

2.2.3. Mentoring

Mentoring has the purpose of engaging individuals, building relationships, and exposing them to a range of activities or opportunities. While outreach workers can serve as mentors, there are also more formal mentoring programs that focus on building rapport and trust with the client and teaching the client various skills or knowledge. Programs discussed in this literature review incorporated mentoring in prevention services (e.g., Los Angeles GRP site), intervention services (such as the service provided to offenders in the Indianapolis SACSI site or the mentoring provided by outreach workers in Chicago CeaseFire), or some combination of the two (e.g., Richmond and North Miami Beach GRP sites; multiple SACSI sites) (Cahill et al. 2008; Coldren et al. 2002; Roehl et al. 2005; Skogan et al. 2008).

Weed and Seed sites often incorporate mentoring as a social intervention component, either adopting the Drug Education for Youth (DEFY) program, a multi-phase prevention program for youth, or incorporating their own evidence-based mentoring component (such as Boys and Girls Clubs of America (BGCA) or Big Brothers Big Sisters of America (BBBSA) (Executive Office for Weed and Seed 2000). As stand-alone pro-
grams, efforts such as BGCA and BBBSA have been found effective, and incorporating a well-established program into a comprehensive program is popular. More specifically, in assessments of BGCA by Public/Private Ventures, youth surveys (n = 320), program attendance records, and in-depth interviews with a sample of youth found that those who participated at higher levels in BGCA had positive improvements in school (such as skipping school less and increased academic confidence) and were less likely to begin carrying weapons or use drugs or marijuana (Arbreton et al. 2009). Using random assignment (n = 1,000 youth) to separate who would receive BBBSA services and who would be placed on a waiting list during an 18-month period, Public/Private Ventures found that program participants were less likely to begin using drugs or alcohol, were less likely to hit someone else, had positive school outcomes (such as attending class more and earning better grades), and had improved relationships with family and peers (McGill, Mihalic, and Grotpeter 1997).

Many comprehensive programs included in this literature review did not detail which models they followed or which specific aspects worked with mentoring their program participants. In general, programs tended to either develop their own mentoring program to connect adult mentors to at-risk youth (Spergel et al. 2002 provides an example of this in Mesa) or contracted with organizations like BBBSA (as in the case of the Los Angeles GRP site and Weed and Seed sites), especially if there were previously existing partnerships with local mentoring agencies.

2.2.4. Counseling and Therapy

Counseling, in the informal sense, is something that outreach workers in the initiatives reviewed engaged in frequently. However, this review makes a distinction between that type of activity and counseling from individuals with formal training. Individual, family, and group counseling services are all offered to some degree in intervention programs, and the goals of counseling may vary by program; for example, gang reduction programs may focus on counseling sessions related to crises, grief, or post-traumatic stress disorder for older youth, while preventative counseling may be more appropriate for clients in other comprehensive programs. Group counseling may also cluster clients together for services based on a specific shared need, such as substance abuse or gender-specific counseling, and although family counseling is often referenced in community initiatives, it is unclear what this encompasses.

Although some community initiatives indicated that individual and group counseling were significant aspects of the program (such as OJJDP’s Riverside or Little Village program), most intervention programs do not elaborate on the specific types of counseling provided. For example, the Weed and Seed implementation guide lists “counseling” as a service activity in a logic model, with “counseling sessions held” as the suggested measurement (OJP 2005). The guidebook also briefly mentions family counseling in a list of potential services and suggests problem-specific counseling (depending on the community’s targeted issue), such as teen pregnancy prevention. However, further guidance - such as whether the jurisdiction should implement cognitive behavioral therapy, functional family therapy, multi-systemic therapy, or other evidence-based treatment models - is never specified. OJJDP provides some program selection guidance through their Model Programs Guide (http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/mpg), where the steering committee can select a counseling program model based on the local context and targeted problem. However, program evaluations rarely provide much detail on the specific program selected, even if they specify the goal of counseling. A notable exception is Spergel et al. (2002, Appendix C); although a specific program model (such as cognitive behavioral therapy) is not specified, the counseling descriptions go beyond the general topic areas (such as gang-related or school-related issues) and explain the types of activities and interactions with therapists in Mesa’s program.

In the six studies that have ranked BBBSA, four found it to be “effective,” one rated it as a “model” program, and the sixth found it to be “exemplary.” Of the two programs that rated BGCA, both ranked it as “effective.” For more information, see the Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence’s Matrix of Programs, available at www.colorado.edu/cspv/blueprints/matrixfiles/matrix.pdf (last updated 11/2009).
In general, extensive analyses are not often conducted on this program element. The literature suggest that individual counseling is linked to a reduction in violent arrests, compared to other services offered (Spergel 2007), that outreach workers have rated family counseling as being slightly more effective than individual counseling (Spergel 2007), and that in a meta-analysis of program elements, programs with the most consistently positive effects used individual counseling, behavioral programs, and interpersonal skills programs (Lipsey, Wilson, and Cothern 2000). In general, it is unclear how often clients should participate in counseling, or how long sessions should be. These program specifics tend to vary by youth, with those at higher risk having more success with higher dosages and those at low or medium risk levels benefiting more from lower dosages (Spergel et al. 2003).

In the institutional and community corrections context, there is significant emphasis on use of cognitive-behavioral approaches to reducing risk of recidivism, particularly among higher-risk offenders (see Crime and Justice Institute 2009). Cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) focuses on the identification of “thinking errors” that lead to and justify undesirable behavior. In the criminal justice context, this means criminal behavior. The community interventions covered in this review do not appear to utilize CBT (although it is difficult to say for certain as specific modalities are rarely specified), but it may be possible for such interventions to do so, especially for populations under community supervision.

2.2.5. Case Management

Regardless of the specific goals and objectives of the various comprehensive programs reviewed in the literature, every initiative that targeted persons for prevention or intervention services used some form of case management. Although the strategy behind case management varies among programs, this program element is generally used to assess a client, determine which service(s) a client should receive through case planning, and document the process and outcomes. Case management should be comprehensive and individualized, with services focused on addressing certain needs or risk factors and the age of the youth taken into account. Although conventional case management offered by a single case manager can be successful when well implemented, wrap-around case management, which involves multiple community-based agencies providing a coordinated assessment and case planning, has numerous advantages (Burchard, Bruns, and Burchard 2002). Most notably, an interagency team can provide a variety of services to clients that might not be available through a single case manager (Spergel et al. 2002).

While single-agency case management is sometimes used, many comprehensive programs elect to use a collaborative, team-based approach. In a team-based approach, agencies typically prepare background information on the youth based on the information each partner has access to and can share with the group (e.g., probation records, school records, etc.). One agency (and often, one specific person) typically leads the meetings to schedule dates, select the youth that will be discussed, and initiate the conversation. In addition to offering more services and resources to clients, an advantage of implementing a team-based approach to case management in Mesa’s OJJDP program was that they attended other project meetings together (such as those of the Steering Committee) and needed to mesh their varied working styles and collaborate to provide case management services (Spergel et al. 2002).

In the Riverside Comprehensive Gang Model, the project team used a Service Needs Assessment Team to deliver case management services to clients (Spergel, Wa, and Sosa 2003). The group that met regularly to share information about clients and determine services and referrals consisted of police, probation, outreach workers, school representatives, Department of Human Resource personnel, and local grassroots organizations. In the Los Angeles site in the Gang Reduction Program, the multidisciplinary team included police officers, the police gang unit, probation, US Attorney Office, state corrections, school counseling services, a local high school, school police, and a substance abuse provider. Each meeting focused on three

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3For example, the Hartford, Connecticut Weed and Seed site used family-based case management services for clients. Although services were provided to the entire family, there was one primary agency designated to conduct the assessment and case planning services (Dunworth et al. 1999b).
or four specific clients that were especially challenging cases (Cahill et al. 2008). As a third example, a PSN site in Utah developed the Community Action Team, a group of law enforcement and community organization representatives, to review cases weekly and provide case management to clients (Institute for Law and Justice 2005).

### 2.2.6. Mental Health

Mental health treatment programs are viewed as important to crime prevention because they address an underlying contributor to many delinquent or criminal acts. The justice system has a history of concern with the "criminalization" of mental health problems, or the idea that individuals with mental health issues are being incarcerated and punished instead of treated (Belcher 1988; Torrey et al. 1992). The prevalence of mental health problems for adults in jail, prison, or on probation (Ditton 1999) and for youth in the juvenile justice system (Wierson et al. 1992) is often higher than diagnosed mental health issues in the community. There has been an increased focus on mental health as a serious issue for the criminal justice system, including legislative changes, increasing attempts to screen individuals before entering the criminal justice system, implementing diversion programs, and identifying available services within and outside of correctional settings (Arons 2000; Cocozza and Skowyra, 2000; Fisher et al. 2006).

Attempting to address a complex issue, comprehensive and community-based approaches to treating mental health have been suggested as solutions (Fisher et al. 2006; Skowyra and Cocozza 2007). More commonly, mental health programs have been linked to existing comprehensive programs. For example, problem-solving officers were asked about their interactions with mental health partners in a recent community policing study (Wilson and Cox 2008), and mental health services or referrals were included as a program component for Chicago CeaseFire, GRP, and the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Model. Due to the link between mental health and crime, mental health service providers are often viewed as important potential partners in both intervention and prevention efforts to reduce crime in the community.

### 2.2.7. Substance Abuse

Risk factors have been determined for substance abuse in various domains, including the individual/peer (e.g., friends who engage in or have favorable attitudes towards substance abuse), school (e.g., lack of commitment to school), family (e.g., family history of substance abuse), and community (e.g., norms and attitudes) levels (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1995). A variety of programs exist to provide prevention and intervention treatment to youth and adults. In an attempt to highlight the most effective programs, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) has compiled a database of 163 evidence-based programs and practices through the National Registry of Effective Prevention Programs (NREPP) that rates each targeted outcome in an intervention program and assesses the quality of the research conducted to evaluate these programs (http://nrepp.samhsa.gov, accessed 9/26/2010).

While best practice guides and lists of effective programs are regularly maintained from a variety of research and scholarly sources, a synthesis of effective substance abuse prevention programs was compiled by Winters et al. (2004) to find the common themes. That synthesis emphasized the following elements that effective programs typically have in common: attention towards psychosocial risk factors believed to spark or maintain substance abuse; a focus on alcohol and tobacco, based on the assumptions of the gateway drug hypothesis; targeting multiple influences (such as peers and parents) and settings; targeting youth through multiple grades in school (or enough dosage); tailoring the program based on age, culture, and context; having sufficient resources; a focus on social skills for youth and discipline for parents; having a bottom-up, multi-agency decision-making project team; and using certain strategies (such as high quality staff or promoting the program in the community) to increase program sustainability (Winters et al. 2004).
Several of these elements, such as narrow targeting and partnership strategies, overlap with the broader themes found in effective programs discussed in this review. In addition to federally funded programs that focus primarily on “weakening the link between drug abuse and crime,” such as drug court initiatives or programs focused on reducing the use of prescription drugs or underage drinking, programs such as Weed and Seed, SACSI, and OJJDP/Spergel model have program elements that are linked to substance abuse treatment for prevention or intervention. In other words, while not always a central focus of the community-based programs that were reviewed in the literature, substance abuse, illegal drug use, and trafficking have an important connection to initiatives attempting to reduce crime and improve the quality of life in a community.

2.2.8. Job Training/Placement

Job-related services have been notably effective in past crime-focused intervention programs (Howell 2000). Employment services can take a variety of forms but are most successful when they are tailored to meet the needs of specific individuals or groups, and focus not only on job placement but also job retention and job quality. People bring different assets and challenges to the job search process, with varying levels of motivation, reading, writing, and interpersonal skills and familiarity with workplace norms. Their circumstances also dictate their ability to work: unstable housing, unmet childcare needs, or difficulty with transportation can all act as barriers to getting or keeping a job. A criminal background can also make it difficult to find a job. Non-custodial parents may have less incentive to work if their wages will be garnished to meet child support obligations. Some may be willing and able to work full-time but can only find part-time work or cannot find a job that pays enough to make ends meet. Some of the most common employment services are assistance with job search and placement, but for individuals with one or more barriers to employment, more intensive training and support services can be necessary.

Past gang-related program evaluations have found that motivated clients are more successful in the program, both in terms of finding and keeping a job, and spending resources on unmotivated clients is often ineffective (Spergel 2007). Job placement is typically a popular service (especially for older youth), and clients enrolled in this service tend to spend less time with gang friends and more time with significant others (Spergel 2007). Maintaining a legitimate job has also been found to significantly reduce violence arrests and drug arrest rates (Short and Hughes 2006).

Although many programs use outreach workers for the job counselor role, this service can also be delivered through an interagency partnership. For example, in SACSI probation officers, social service agencies, faith-based organizations, and community-based organizations worked together to provide this service element (Roehl et al. 2005). Having additional (and multidisciplinary) staff may be especially useful for locating available jobs for clients. Unlike many other services and programs, which primarily require project staff and project resources, available jobs in the community are often limited for clients. In addition, immigration status is a common challenge for this service, with legal counsel and naturalization services needed for some clients beforehand. Outreach workers often need to use a variety of methods to find jobs for their clients, including informal connections, contacting agencies or employers, and newspaper ads. When job opportunities are scarce, training programs (such as resume workshops or interview sessions) may be beneficial alternatives. For example, Project Fresh Start in one SACSI site provided up to 40 hours of job preparation and up to three months of on the job training, in addition to job coaches and other supportive services, to prepare clients for the job market. Some comprehensive community initiatives not directly engaged in crime reduction have addressed these barriers by providing life skills training prior to job placement (Meyer et al. 2000). Others target specific business sectors, as the Greater Williamsburg Collective did with the culinary sector (Meyer et al. 2000). Their effort is notable for also incorporating entrepreneurship and the starting of small businesses. Still others devoted resources to computer and internet training (Bynum, Mills, and Jacoby 1999; Meyer et al. 2000).

Even when jobs are not as restricted in terms of availability, clients may need preparation beforehand to
increase the likelihood of obtaining a job. For example, 85 percent of Chicago CeaseFire outreach workers reported a lack of “job readiness” as a major issue their clients faced (Skogan et al. 2008). Education deficits, addiction, and mental health issues might all be barriers to gaining and retaining employment. Sustained access to child care services is vital (Briggs, Mueller, and Sullivan 1997). An educational service component can also complement the job training and placement program to increase a client’s skill set and potential for advancement. For example, in Riverside the six-week job training program paid a $150 stipend for an entry-level position and was accompanied by mentoring and tutoring services (from the client’s employer). Spergel et al. (2003) noted that this was “[o]ne of the best developed and most effective components.”

The centrality of work to desired outcomes is not the same for all individuals, and particularly differs for youth and older adults. Uggen and Wakefield’s systematic review of the literature on the relationship between work and crime (2008) found that provision of basic job opportunities were especially beneficial among older criminal offenders. Higher quality employment opportunities have an even greater effect, suggesting that attending to improving human capital will reap better results. The evidence for adolescents is more complicated. There is evidence that work intensity can be positively associated with delinquency for adolescents, perhaps because it weakens their attachment to school. The employment component of any prevention effort should be designed to take these nuances into account.

Other place-based initiatives that incorporate employment services and employment programs that target disconnected youth provide additional insight into successful program design. The Jobs-Plus program aimed to boost work and earnings among public housing residents and was successful in doing so, although the effects were modest. One of the key elements was that the program offered rent-based financial incentives to increase the earnings impact of low-wage jobs. (Typically, public housing rent increases with increased wages. Rents remained flat for Jobs-Plus participants, so they were able to keep more of their earnings.) This suggests that additional financial supports encourage increased employment for individuals whose skill levels make them likely candidates for low-wage jobs (Bloom et al. 2005).

The Neighborhood Jobs Initiative (NJI) highlights the critical role of a trusted community-based organization. This type of organization’s knowledge of the community’s employment-related needs and strong relationship with community members make it a valuable partner in ensuring that local services match individual and community needs. NJI was also more successful in neighborhoods with more stable, less transitory populations, since more residents would remain in the neighborhood long enough to benefit, which helps build relationships and networks to strengthen the employment search of other residents over time (Molina and Howard 2003).

The New Hope program provided work supports and in some cases subsidized employment in order to address problems in the low-wage labor market. The program, located in two neighborhoods in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, offered an earnings supplement to raise earnings above the poverty level, low-cost health insurance, and subsidized childcare. For those unable to find full-time work, the program provided job placement assistance and referral to a short-term subsidized wage-paying community service job if necessary. The program boosted employment levels and earnings during its three-year life, and had positive longer-term effects on children: with children more likely to be successful in school, showing positive social behavior, and taking part in employment and career preparation activities. The program results point to the importance of supplementing low-wage work with services (child care and health insurance) that could otherwise be difficult to afford and supplementing earnings. Frontline staff, known as “project representatives” or “reps” played an important role as case manager, job coach, and counselors. The program was most effective for residents with one barrier to employment, rather than multiple barriers (Miller et al. 2008).

Short-term transitional jobs programs or service conservation corps programs are helpful for adults with serious barriers to employment as well as young people involved in the juvenile justice system or disconnected from school or employment. For people unlikely to find or keep a job on their own, these programs

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4In a comparison of the Spergel model across sites, Spergel, Wa, and Sosa (2006) found the provision of social opportunities (which includes education, job, and cultural training) to be “moderately important.”
provide a paycheck or stipend, exposure to the work world in a supportive context, and case management or mentoring. People with very low skills, little work experience, or other barriers to employment thus earn a paycheck while gaining experience and build a work history that will help them find unsubsidized employment down the line (Abt Associates 2003; Jastrzab et al. 1996; Redcross et al. 2009; Waller 2002).

In summary, assisting individuals with getting and keeping jobs involves meeting different challenges for different individuals. For those motivated and ready to join the workforce, it can involve helping them overcome the reluctance of employers to hire people with criminal records. Others may be ready to join the workforce, but need other assistance such as child care or earnings supplements in order to work in low-wage jobs. Many will need to improve their education level and skills. The most difficult group will need other interventions to address issues such as addiction, mental illness, or anti-social attitudes before they will be able to sustain employment.

2.2.9. School-Based Activities

Schools have played an important role in many community-based intervention programs. Referrals to schools (to enroll or reenroll in classes or a GED program), partnerships with schools, and school-based programs can all be utilized in an intervention effort. Spergel (2007) found that school referrals positively, but not significantly, related to completion of high school or General Educational Development (GED) degree (especially if provided by youth workers). Having services located at a school (such as an office or classroom for outreach workers) enables project staff to connect with youth and enroll students in services. Weed and Seed sites typically located a safe haven, the multiservice center each site must maintain, at either a school or community-based organization (Dunworth and Mills 1999). The presence of a project staff member can also connect the program to referrals from school deans, teachers, counselors, school resource officers (SROs) and other staff, who may be able to pinpoint youth eligible for the program (depending on what the intervention program targets).

SRO programs may also be an intervention strategy, since their roles often include law enforcement (e.g., preventing school crime and investigating crimes), teaching law or criminal justice related classes, informal and formal counseling, and building rapport with students (which often helps SROs gather information about crimes or potential crimes in the school). Although there is no empirical evidence that SRO programs are effective in reducing crime in schools, anecdotal evidence from a nineteen national site study suggested that criminal behavior declined when SRO programs were well implemented in schools (Finn et al. 2005). For example, SROs appeared to be successful with reducing targeted behaviors (such as cigarette smoking in some programs and gang activity in others) and building relationships with students tended to decrease the need for school discipline and crime in or around the school site. SRO activity may be best thought of in the larger context of community crime reduction. However, certain challenges also accompany SRO programs. SROs with unclear roles and duties often had difficulty establishing themselves in schools, were an ineffective use of resources, and were not usually retained in the initiative (Finn et al. 2005).

The Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) program is another example of a school-based program intended to reduce crime and delinquency. The GREAT curriculum is targeted to middle-school students and was intended to both help youth avoid gang membership and criminal activity and develop a positive relationship with law enforcement. An evaluation of GREAT found no differences between participants and nonparticipants in terms of gang involvement and delinquent behavior (although it appeared that there may have been lagged effects on social attitudes (Esbensen et al. 2002). The curriculum was revamped in light of the negative results, and an evaluation of the new curriculum is underway (Peterson et al. 2009).
2.2.10. **Family-Based Interventions**

Family-focused programs that target an individual’s risk factors are popular strategies among many of the comprehensive intervention programs reviewed, and family-based crime prevention, or programs intended to target family risk factors, are also viewed as an effective way to reduce crime. In a review of youth violence indicators in the literature, Hawkins et al. (1998) found a positive relationship between violent criminal arrest rates of parents and violent crime patterns of their children, which indicates that the specific offender may not be the only one who might benefit from intervention services. In addition to the influence of parents or guardians, siblings may also influence one another’s behaviors. Harmful parenting practices, including anti-social parents or inconsistent punishment practices, are one issue that programs have attempted to alleviate (Tremblay and Craig 1995). Home visitation programs have been described as having “perhaps the most promising results” in crime prevention, even when considering that this program typically ranges in terms of staff (from nurses to teachers to other professionals) and service types (Sherman et al. 1998, 77). Sherman et al. (1998) also found that while home visitation programs were more successful at reducing delinquency risk factors when combined with other services, on their own they were also fairly effective. Providing family-based parent training in school settings and family therapy provided by clinicians have also found consistently positive results for reducing delinquency risk factors (Tremblay and Craig 1995).

In a randomized trial of substance abuse treatments, Rowland, Chapman, and Henggeler (2008) found that evidence-based treatments such as multi-systemic therapy (MST) and contingency management had positive effects on the substance abuse patterns (although not the criminal activities) of the participants’ high risk siblings. Rowland et al. (2008) suggest that these treatment programs may have been more influential than other juvenile community treatment programs (such as family court or drug court without those program elements) on the siblings’ behavior because the parental skills obtained through this program, such as helping the youth with management skills or learning discipline techniques, may have directly or indirectly impacted siblings. Likewise, in a meta-analysis of family-based prevention programs, Farrington and Welsh (2003) concluded that the most effective programs targeting family risk factors utilize behavioral parent training, such as MST, home visitation, and day care/preschool programs.

Programs such as MST, functional family therapy (FFT), and parental workshops or training sessions, which work with the family to reduce risk factors, delinquency, and crime, are seen throughout the comprehensive program literature. As one of the many pieces in a wrap-around service approach, the effectiveness of these specific programs within comprehensive initiatives is often difficult to tease out. However, programs that address family risk factors have been found to be among the best and most effective practices for violence and crime reduction, and are highly recommended strategies in the literature (see Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence Blueprints, and OJJDP Model Programs Guide).

2.2.11. **Addressing Physical Disorder**

Physical disorder, including unkempt public spaces, graffiti, and abandoned automobiles, is a potential target for prevention activities targeted at places, rather than individuals. First articulated almost three decades ago, the “broken windows” theory argues that physical disorder, and social disorder such as verbal harassment of women or public gives the appearance of a breakdown in public order, which encourages further and more serious vandalism and an escalating level of crime (Wilson and Kelling 1982). While the existence of a causal link between the environment and crime is much debated, some correlation between the two is now generally acknowledged (Briggs, Mueller, and Sullivan 1997). At the very least, perceptions of personal safety and the quality of neighborhood infrastructure go hand in hand (Korbin 2001).

Addressing physical disorder also provides an easy entry point for citizen involvement in troubled communities, particularly in contrast to perceived high risk activities such as talking directly to the police (Briggs, Mueller, and Sullivan 1997). Fixing windows, painting peeling or defaced walls, and group activities, such as marches or block parties, allow neighborhood residents to define and improve their community without
confronting or otherwise being in conflict with the criminal element. These activities can also increase the number of “eyes on the street” which may also increase the level of social control, though the increase may be transitory (Jacobs 1961).
Process and Structural Elements

The review now turns to questions of process and structure. The literature consistently emphasizes the importance of such elements as leadership, how partner meetings are run, how the community is included (or not), and how progress is monitored to the ultimate success of crime reduction and community improvement initiatives. For that reason, these questions are examined in their own right. It distinguishes between interagency collaboration and community engagement, because both are very important, but the considerations and mechanisms for doing each well are importantly different. It also devotes a separate subsection to issues of sustainability, because the literature makes clear that this is an important area that merits specific attention.

3.1. INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION

Interagency collaboration is a joint arrangement or set of formal and informal interactions between agencies that involves (a) jointly institutionalizing new rules, procedures, and structures to govern inter-organizational relationships; (b) joint management decision-making; (c) solving problems that cannot be solved by single organizations within the existing constraints; and (d) creating new public value or making a joint discovery (Amirkhanyan 2008; Bazzoli et al. 1997; Selden, Sowa, and Sandfort 2006). Collaboration allows groups to reach goals that cannot be achieved by acting singly (or not as efficiently). Its key features are that problems and solutions are shared across agencies; group objectives are met through consensus building; and resources, training, personnel, and program philosophies are blended (O’Malley 2007). Benefits to interagency collaboration in service provision include: better coordination of care, improved relationships, resource maximization, and innovative problem solving (Bruner 1991).

In collaborative initiatives, the process through which partners are engaged, and the initiative is planned, developed, managed, and sustained can be as important to success as the individual activities carried out as a result of the process. This reality is reflected in the extensive attention paid to process elements in the literature reviewed. This section of the literature review summarizes the lessons for the literature on process elements of interagency collaborative initiatives. This review treats engagement of the community in a separate section, but many aspects of engagement with large and sophisticated community organizations may be more like interagency collaboration.

There are four levels of interagency collaboration, listed here from least collaborative to most (Amirkhanyan 2008):

1. Networking
   (a) Agencies are aware of each other
(b) Agencies can make referrals to other agencies

2. Service Coordination
   (a) Agencies assist clients in obtaining services from other agencies
   (b) Supports coordination of supports and resources (i.e. avoids duplication)

3. Cooperation
   (a) Agencies regularly share decision making and accountability
   (b) Jointly scheduled activities and planning time

4. Collaboration
   (a) Independent agencies act as one capable of problem-solving
   (b) Sharing and merging of resources

Good interagency collaboration takes time (perhaps years) to develop. The evolution of successful initiatives included in this review often begins with 3) and moves toward 4) to greater or lesser degrees. The development of interagency collaboration is a means to an end: however when done well it can generate public value beyond the immediate ends to which it is directed.

3.1.1. Leadership

Leadership of interagency collaborations takes several forms. There is a role for a lead agency. There is the coordination and leadership of a project director (where present). There are the formal and information leadership roles that participants in the collaboration take over time. All are important. When Spergel, Wa, and Sosa (2006) looked at program implementation characteristics across the six initial Spergel Model implementing sites (Chicago/Little Village, Mesa, Riverside, Bloomington-Normal, San Antonio, and Tucson), they found that city/county leadership, interagency/street team coordination, criminal justice management and lead agency/management/commitment were “extremely important” structural factors impacting success or failure in program implementation. Reflecting on the Little Village intervention, Spergel concluded that law enforcement “must” be the lead agency for gang reduction initiatives (2007, 342).

OJJDP’s overview of the Comprehensive Gang Model in practice (OJJDP 2008) found that designating the right lead agency is important to project success. OJJDP did not define a lead agency in terms of project control, but rather in terms of providing the administrative framework (such as staff support, convening meetings, etc.) to support collaborative activity. Police departments played the lead agency role in many of the initiatives included in this review. In SACSI, leadership was provided by U.S. Attorney’s Offices. The U.S. Attorneys and their Assistant U.S. Attorneys “lent authority, stature, and power to the effort” (Coldren et al. 2002). In addition, a lead agency should be willing to share project control or decision making powers, be flexible, have a view of the larger picture, and interact well with other agencies (Roman et al. 2002).

OJJDP’s overview of the Comprehensive Gang Model in practice also found that designating the right project director is important. The Comprehensive Gang Model also found project management to be a critical component of a successful site. Spergel (2007) recounted how the implementation of the comprehensive model was initially unfocused in Little Village, Chicago, and as the evaluator he stepped in to provide the needed leadership and guidance that eventually set the program back on track to a successful implementation. The lessons from the CCI literature indicate that a coordinator and full-time staff should be employed by the CCI. Similarly, a review of SACSI lessons learned found that a designated project director is “critical to success and sustainment,” because in addition to coordinating the various agencies, tracking the effectiveness of various components of the intervention, and other significant project management responsibilities, the project director also moved the project forward and focused on the goals ahead (Dalton 2003, 19). In fact, lack of successful outcomes in the Phase II SACSI sites is partly attributed to lack of a full-time project
coordinator (Roehl et al. 2008). Dalton also points out a lesson learned from Boston Ceasefire: without a clear project director, even a strong steering committee or working group may begin to relax the focus and intensity when a program is successful, which can lead to a regression in progress.

Coldren et al. (2002) concluded that SACSI worked best when leadership was shared, with different partners taking on greater leadership roles at different stages of the process (see also O’Malley 2007). Shared leadership is particularly important given that any collaborative is likely to experience turnover, and sharing leadership makes a collaborative more resilient in the event that a key leader leaves the effort. As a general proposition, influential participants need to have leadership qualities, assets, or resources to contribute (or the ability to acquire resources), investment in the project, and a commitment to partnering with other organizations (Roman et al. 2002).

3.1.2. Partnership Structure

Almost all of the public safety initiatives included in the literature review structured the partnership around an interagency steering committee, which was essentially a group that spearheaded the initiative and served as the decision making authority. There was greater variation regarding the lead agency, the role (or existence) of a program coordinator, and the role of grassroots community partners. Organizing a steering committee (or working group) is a key element of the SACSI (Coldren et al. 2002), OJJDP’s Comprehensive Gang Model (2009), and PSN (Dalton 2003) models. For the SACSI program model, the partnership was designed to be not only multi-agency, but also multidisciplinary and extend beyond criminal justice (which in practice, proved to be difficult for many SACSI sites). Boston Ceasefire, Chicago CeaseFire, the Comprehensive Gang Model, Weed and Seed, PSN, and other initiatives all varied in the degree of diversity of the agencies represented, but all encouraged the integration of a variety of agencies that could bring new perspectives and knowledge to the table. In fact, the absence of a coherent steering committee entity was cited by Spergel (2007) as a major weakness of the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Program.

The literature on successful public safety initiatives discusses the role of meetings at multiple stages of the process. During the planning stage, steering committee meetings were used to develop a shared understanding of the issue at hand and to arrive at a deeper (and ideally data-derived) appreciation of the dynamics underlying it (see Kennedy, Braga, and Piehl 2001 for a good description of this process in the development of Boston Ceasefire). This type of strategic meeting can continue to provide oversight of initiatives, while operational meetings take on increasing relevance once the interventions are underway. In some cases, these meetings were separated based on goals. For example, the Riverside Comprehensive Gang Model split meetings between security-focused meetings (where agencies share information about specific incidents and targeted types of crime) and services-focused meetings (an information exchange regarding referrals or service provision to clients) (Spergel, Wa, and Sosa 2003). SACSI Phase I sites experienced expansion of the core group and creation of focused groups over time. This led to a formalization of policies and procedures, such as signed Memoranda of Agreement or information-sharing agreements to replace more informal partnership arrangements at the start of the project (Coldren et al. 2002). In fact, the OJJDP Gang Model Assessment Guide (2009, Exhibit 2.2) provides a sample Memorandum of Understanding for practitioners looking to create these formal partnerships.

Who agencies send to meetings is also important. Collaboration is most effective when team members: have the support of their agency, understand their role within the group, are familiar with the role of each partner agency, are familiar with the group’s collective history, and are empowered to make decisions on behalf of the agency they represent (O’Malley 2007). Surveying lessons learned from gang program evaluations, Howell (2010) concluded that the best results were found when steering committees mixed two groups. The first is individuals from upper management in key partnering agencies, who could affect organizational change in their home agencies as necessary to support the effort. The second is individuals with influence in the community, including residents, people from grassroots groups, and representatives from religious organizations.
A variety of evaluation instruments are available to assist agencies in the collaboration process. Instruments focus on readiness to collaborate as well as outcome evaluations. Roman, Jenkins and Wolf (2006) developed a conceptual framework for community justice partnerships that included performance measures and instruments for monitoring and evaluating the development, implementation, and outcomes of such partnerships. The framework provides a way for partners to think through and prepare to measure and monitor the assessment and planning, implementation, goal achievement and maintenance, and re-assessment and sustainability phases of a community justice effort. See also the Handbook on Developing and Evaluating Interagency Collaboration in Early Childhood Special Education Programs (O’Malley 2007) for examples.

3.1.3. Barriers and Challenges to Interagency Collaboration

There are a number of barriers or challenges to interagency collaboration. First and foremost, the collaborative process—with its input seeking, feedback, and negotiation between partners—requires additional time and resources (Amirkhanyan 2008). Among service providers and community organizations, fragmentation, duplication, and inadequate existing services are major barriers to interagency collaboration. Without accurate information about partners, it is difficult to work together and find the appropriate roles for participants. Applicable collaboration strategies may be lacking (Agran, Cain, and Cavin 2002; Benz et al. 1995). Partners in the collaboration may be, or see themselves to be, in competition for resources. Other challenges include developing appropriate outcomes and evaluations, empowering group members, and ensuring consistent member engagement (Bruner 1991).

Some of the public safety initiatives saw differences in ability to collaborate, or the speed with which collaboration could be established. Stakeholders engaged in suppression efforts, usually drawn from criminal justice agencies that have experience working together, are often able to collaborate more quickly and effectively than those working on intervention elements. This was found to be the case in the Gang Reduction Program sites (Cahill et al. 2008). Given the importance of balancing suppression activities (associated with criminal justice agencies) and intervention activities to achieving success, this can be a potentially counterproductive dynamic. It may be that the need to balance suppression and intervention is always a latent threat to these types of initiatives. Spergel attributes the termination of the Little Village gang intervention in part to the Chicago Police Department’s “singular interest in a suppression approach” (2007, 339).

3.2. Community Engagement

In addition to the importance of partnership integration across agencies, partnerships also depend on community engagement (Roman, Jenkins, and Wolff 2006; Rosenbaum 2002). There are a number of levels of engagement of the community with a collaborative initiative of the kind discussed in this review (see figure 3.1). The first is the target or client level of the initiative, where community members are at the “receiving end” of initiative activities throughout the process, from the arrest stage to the provision of services. The next level is being informed of the existence of the overall strategy or approach, and what it involves and intends to accomplish. At the next level, the community has the opportunity to participate in and provide input to the planning of the initiative. At the mobilization level the community is carrying out elements of the initiative approach in whole or in part. The final level is community ownership of the initiative, typified by comprehensive community initiatives (CCIs). CCIs target a variety of services and activities to distressed neighborhoods to improve overall quality of life. The relevant distinguishing feature of CCIs in this review is their treatment of community engagement and community capacity-building as ends in themselves, valuable independent of immediate impact on crime, disorder, or other community indicators.

Initiatives included in this review vary regarding the degree of community engagement they foster, although
there is a clear consensus in the literature that community engagement is important. The community can be defined in a number of ways, and initiatives have worked to involve and mobilize the community by including community residents in the process (such as holding community forums to discuss the program), working with community-based organizations (most notably through representation on the steering committee), incorporating influential community figures (such as the clergy), or a combination of the three. There are also a variety of possible organizations, which have been categorized as frontline organizations (such as Parent Teacher Association meetings, clubs, or faith-based groups); police departments, local government, and businesses; and the state, regional, or national counterparts to local organizations (Roman, Jenkins, and Wolff 2006). This section of the review will focus on lessons regarding the three greatest levels of community engagement.

Figure 3.1: Levels of Community Engagement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ownership</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participation and Input</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target/Client</td>
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</tbody>
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Source: Adapted from Roman et al. 2002.

Engaging the community depends to some extent on trust, and building trust with a community can be extremely difficult. Encouragement of community involvement may be especially necessary in neighborhoods that experienced lackluster programming in the past (Briggs, Mueller, and Sullivan 1997). Cultural and language barriers may exist between the community and partner agency staff. One common obstacle to these sorts of interventions is the often extreme mobility of households in distressed areas. Residents may not be interested in staying for the long term (perhaps because of the very problems the initiative is trying to address); and therefore community building can be difficult, and place unwanted demands on residents (Briggs, Mueller, and Sullivan, 1997). Though it oversimplifies the complexities of the process, listening to residents’ discourse can be a first step toward fostering a positive relationship with disenfranchised community members (Pitcoff 1998). This can be part of a dialogue initiated by informing them of the presence and intent of an initiative.

3.2.1. Community Social Cohesion

It is important to recognize the connection between community characteristics and capacity to problemsolve, and crime. There has been a demonstrated link between social cohesion, which is often described as the willingness of neighbors to intervene (in conflicts or when problems arise) for the common good, and
levels of crime and violence (Sampson et al. 1997). This concept of trust, informal social control, and strong community networks has been found to mediate violence by influencing concentrated disadvantage and residential instability (Sampson et al. 1997). Even after accounting for the effects of neighborhood disorder (or broken windows theory), increased social cohesion is related to a reduction in violent crime rates, and may even be more influential than disorder when explaining crime (Sampson and Raudenbush 1999).

Social cohesion is also tied to the importance of norms and attitudes toward crime and violence, which is an important aspect of several of the comprehensive initiatives reviewed in the literature. For example, Browning (2002) found that neighborhoods with a low tolerance for intimate partner violence had a positive influence on the effect of social cohesion and ultimately violence levels. In addition to informal social networks, community organizations and associations are also important ways to promote social cohesion (Moreno et al. 2001). Browning et al. (2004) caution that while social networks may improve social cohesion, they may also provide increased social capital to offenders. Therefore, the development and maintenance of pro-social community attitudes and norms is an important aspect of building community support for comprehensive initiatives.

A similar concept has also been applied to other settings, with positive results. For example, teachers with strong perceptions of efficacy have been linked to increased student performance, improved parent/teacher relationships, a positive school atmosphere, and a reduction in the negative impacts of low socio-economic status (Brinson and Steiner 2007). However, while the evidence that community attributes such as social cohesion, trust, and collective efficacy are related to levels of crime and disorder, it has not been demonstrated that deliberate efforts to create communities with more social cohesion can be an effective means of reducing crime and disorder. The relationship has not yet given rise to a proven intervention.

Proponents of the Ceasefire and DMI interventions posit benefits to communities in terms of social cohesion and relationships with key criminal justice agencies beyond reductions in crime. Communities afflicted by crime and disorder associated with drug markets develop narratives regarding law enforcement doing deliberate damage to their communities, and the law enforcement agencies that police them develop narratives about community indifference to and complicity in crime, conflicting narratives that are “soaked in race” (Kennedy 2008). Kennedy argues that the DMI has profoundly impacted how high-crime communities and law enforcement perceive one another. By enhancing trust in the criminal justice system and organizing communities to tackle the problem of gang violence or open-air drug markets, Ceasefire and DMI implementation may increase social control and collective efficacy in the target communities.

3.2.2. Community Participation and Input

One level of community engagement is facilitating community participation and input in the initiative. Community input into public safety initiatives has substantial impact on the form they take. As Coldren et al. note: “When non-traditional crime prevention partners—typically social service agencies, clergy, community organizations, private businesses, schools, and others—become involved, SACSI activities are more likely to emphasize prevention and intervention strategies rather than just enforcement and suppression-oriented strategies” (2002, 46). The Winston-Salem, NC and Portland, OR strategies were notable for this kind of community inclusion, and both developed broader, more multi-faceted strategies than did in other SACSI sites.

The lessons to be learned from this are old ones. Who you invite to participate in the beginning matters at later stages (the emergent process), and it will be more difficult to include nontraditional members later, after major project decisions are made. If you only invite law enforcement and criminal justice representatives to participate, the majority of interventions are apt to be law enforcement and criminal justice system oriented (Coldren et al. 2002).
One potential advantage of utilizing community policing approaches is that it naturally tends to this kind of community engagement.

The evidence from the literature on the impact of community participation is varied. Among the Weed and Seed sites, the most effective implementation strategies relied on bottom-up participatory decision-making, especially when combined with efforts to build capacity among local organizations (Dunworth et al. 1999a). Community capacity is the ability of residents and neighborhood organizations to work, in a sustained manner, toward quality of life improvements (Booth and Crouter 2001). Creating meaningful grassroots involvement is a challenge, even when identified as a desired program element. Only one of six sites implementing the Comprehensive Gang Model had a “good” rating for the implementation of grassroots involvement. For the other five, it was rated either “poor” or “none” (Spergel, Wa, and Sosa 2006). In some cases, key partners may be resistant to such inclusion. In SACSI core groups and law enforcement-oriented working groups, law enforcement representatives sometimes advocated the exclusion of non-law enforcement participants, due to the sensitive intelligence that was often discussed (Coldren et al. 2002).

3.2.3. Community Mobilization

Community mobilization, or the use of the community to actually deliver key program components, is a next level of community engagement after soliciting participation and input into the effort. It is a component of the Comprehensive Gang Model, although Spergel, Wa, and Sosa (2006) found community mobilization “moderately important” to program success. The implementing sites may have valued it even less: only one of six was rated as having a “good” level of implementation, and one other rated as “fair.” The other four had levels of either “poor” or “none.” Mesa, the site that was rated best on this dimension, created a position of Neighborhood Developer responsible for working with target communities to engage the communities in the initiative. Even in Mesa, some key agency staff felt resident involvement was generally low, although many stated that level of involvement did not hinder the Mesa site from achieving most of its goals (Spergel, Wa, and Sosa 2005).

Other programs also rank community mobilization as a key component of the intervention strategy. The Weed and Seed strategy takes a strong stance on the importance of community mobilization, and encourages community involvement from the beginning of the initiative in strategy guides such as “A Guide to Promoting Your Weed and Seed Site” (2004). In a cross-site evaluation study (Dunworth et al. 1999a), certain community settings (such as sites with stronger social and institutional infrastructures, economically developing communities, certain crime types and levels, and more stable residents) impacted the program’s success.

Organizing “community moral voices” in preparation for the notification meetings discussed in the Focused Deterrence section is a fundamental component of the group violence strategy that evolved from Boston Ceasefire (Kennedy 2010) and the DMI strategy first used in High Point, NC (Hipple et al. 2009). Community participants in the notification meetings are primarily responsible for challenging norms supporting violence and drug dealing among the targeted offenders. Community mobilization is also one of five core components of the Chicago CeaseFire initiative and is designed to address both short-term (stop the shootings) and long-term (change the community’s norms about violence) goals. Specifically, the project team reached out to clergy and residents “who could be stirred to direct action” for the short-term goal, and a public education campaign was promoted for the long-term goal. However, despite the emphasis placed on this element, research has not investigated the contribution of community mobilization to the success of the strategies.

The structure of Chicago CeaseFire is an interesting example of how operations of a crime reduction intervention might be shared with the community. CeaseFire is operated by the Chicago Project for Violence Prevention (CPVP), and CPVP’s central office provides neighborhoods implementing the program with technical assistance, training and assistance in developing a violence prevention plan, and helps secure funding. CPVP contracts with community-based organizations to carry out the interventions in target neighborhoods. This model has had mixed impacts on implementation. Host organizations with strong
activist ties show a strong capacity to build and participate in local coalitions, and have augmented their
effectiveness by partnering with organizations that could provide needed services for their clients (Skogan
et al. 2008). In some communities, however, it was difficult to find organizations with the necessary
capacity to lead the effort and overcome resident skepticism born of previous failed initiatives. Many of the
smaller host organizations lacked human resources infrastructure such as wage and benefit packages and
conflict resolution processes, which made retaining good workers and handling bad ones difficult. Some
of the larger organizations, being more self-contained, did not build partnerships as broadly as smaller
organizations were obliged to develop. Over the course of the project, CPVP reasserted control over some
faltering programs and took a more active role in seeking accountability for outcomes and fidelity to the
model in struggling sites. At the same time, other sites became more self-sufficient and CPVP handed more
project responsibility to them.

3.2.4. Ownership: Comprehensive Community Initiatives

Comprehensive Community Initiatives arose in the 1990s as ambitious attempts to transform low-income
communities (Kubisch et al. 2010). CCIs are typically funded by foundations, carried out by community-
based organizations (sometimes in partnership with government agencies), and target a variety of services
and activities to improve quality of life in particularly distressed neighborhoods (Fulbright-Anderson,
Kubisch, and Connell 1998). CCIs take a holistic view and perform a range of activities that address issues
such as local environment and economy, affordable housing, accessible transportation, education, cultural
offerings, and increased safety and neighborhood satisfaction. These activities are comprehensive in nature,
and thus very resource intensive. Broadly speaking, CCI investments have focused in several areas:

- A community’s human, economic, and physical development
- Community building strategies to mobilize citizens and strengthen their civic capacity
- Policy and systems change

A comprehensive community initiative involves many aspects of neighborhood improvement but can be
generalized as “an effort to better the lives of children, youth, and families through systems-change work.”
Several characteristics set CCIs apart from conventional service-delivery programs. “[It] include[s] taking
a broad view on community problems, engaging all sectors of the economy, using long-term strategies,
building trust and forging a common purpose, and encouraging participatory decision making” (OJJDP
n.d.). There is no one standard CCI model, though most are related to either human development and
social services or physical revitalization and economic development (Kubisch et al. 2010). Comprehensive
community initiatives range in their scope and intensity but are uniquely oriented toward community
engagement. Just as there is not a standard definition of a CCI, there is not a standard theory of change that
relates CCI program elements to its end results (Fulbright-Anderson, Kubisch, and Connell 1998).

CCIs rely on community engagement to reach its goals, and emphasize resident involvement in program-
matic leadership. They often consider the process of capacity-building and resident empowerment as goals
in themselves. Activities targeting community change are only as effective as the community’s ability to
affect such changes. Thus, it is realistic and necessary to align goals and achievable outcomes of community
change with the existing level of capacity. Comprehensive community initiatives work to increase commu-
nity capacity in several ways. Members grow in leadership, skills, and participation, organizations progress
in their communication with one another, and approaches to programming become more sophisticated
while maintaining their feasibility (Foster-Fishman et al. 2001).

Recent literature is moving away from the comprehensive community initiative model for several reasons.
Foundation-funded initiatives typically have too short of a lifespan to recognize meaningful change. CCIs
are also very ambitious, and the impacts of programming were not as intense as originally planned (Kubisch
et al. 2010). It is difficult to evaluate the causal relationships between a CCI’s program components and
outcomes. Evaluators and foundations do realize this and are moving toward evaluating the contributions
CCIs made in the community as opposed to linking specific outcomes (Kubisch et al. 2010). The concept of comprehensiveness is also evolving; CCIs are moving from addressing every possible community improvement to thinking of comprehensiveness as a guiding principle in their implementation (Kubisch et al. 2010). These issues are not to say that community change and engagement are unattainable, but that there may be a more appropriate model.

3.3. SUSTAINABILITY

The literature on effective comprehensive community initiatives suggests that special attention must be paid to issues of sustainability. Success in generating the desired outcomes is not a guarantee that the effort will be sustained. In fact, despite their achievements and prominence, neither the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Program nor Boston Ceasefire was sustained (Braga, Hureau, and Winship 2008; Spergel 2007).\(^1\)

The process of developing the collaboration and initiative is very important to its eventual success or failure. Hendrickson and Omer (1995) recommend establishing a shared vision agreed upon by all members of the collaborative. Then, the initiative must choose realistic goals, rank them in terms of priority, and match them with achievable objectives. Unrealistic goals set an initiative up for failure, as whatever accomplishments they realize will fall short of what was promised. Hendrickson and Omer also emphasize that successes should be publicized to increase public and internal support for the collaboration. All of these activities set the stage for continual evaluation in terms of the goals and priorities.

One substantial challenge to sustaining successful community initiatives is sufficiency of resources. Grant funding or other time limited awards provided a crucial impetus for many of the efforts discussed in the literature, but bring with them the challenge of continuing the effort in the absence of those resources. Yet funding from government can be even more tenuous. In Chicago CeaseFire, CPVP headquarters funding came from multiyear grants (from state, federal, and foundation sources) and was more stable than funding for field operations, which came from the state (Skogan et al. 2008). This led to instability in the program. CPVP came to believe that fewer but better-staffed sites focusing on larger (and more naturally-defined) target areas would be an improvement, but could not secure a funding structure to support this. As discussed previously, CPVP transferred greater responsibility to strong sites over time, and concentrated its oversight and assistance efforts on struggling sites.

Literature on success of CCIs has found that, due to the variability of their activities, they work most effectively when their funding is flexible (Miller and Burns 2006). For example, while the Annie E. Casey Foundation’s Rebuilding Communities Initiative identified six areas for revitalization and growth, individual sites could focus on those areas most needed. The Communities that Care platform allows CCIs to choose the prevention programming for which they are best suited.

Limitations in resources led to staffing issues in many places. Both the Riverside and Mesa efforts to implement the Comprehensive Gang Model found that outreach workers tended to turn over quickly due to their entry level wages; a challenging and stressful environment; and unappealing work schedules, often involving working nights and weekends (Roman, Jenkins, and Wolff 2006; Spergel, Wa, and Sosa 2003). Mesa also found that police detectives assigned full-time to the center associated with the intervention often left after one year (Spergel, Wa, and Sosa 2002). Turnover was also cited as a challenge in Chicago CeaseFire (Skogan et al. 2008). All Phase I SACSI sites experienced turnover in key positions, which is inevitable, but may be mitigated by continuity within the core group, involvement of agency heads, and leadership invested in more than a single individual (Coldren et al. 2002).

Funding is critical to sustainability, but it is not the only kind of resource initiatives need to continue and thrive. Writing on CCIs notes their need for not only substantial fiscal investment, but also investments in

\(^1\)At the same time, programs that have not produced particularly compelling initial results (although they may have the potential for future successes) have reported acquiring continued funding for a sustained effort (see Cahill 2008).
technical assistance, political will, and patience (Briggs, Mueller, and Sullivan 1997). Technical assistance is a key service external organizations have provided to CCIs that lack the institutional knowledge of certain specific tasks (Miller and Burns 2006). The creators of Chicago CeaseFire recognized this when they set up CPVP to provide ongoing technical assistance to the community organizations running CeaseFire interventions in the field.

Many evaluators of the initiatives included in this review see community engagement as a key to sustaining them. Community engagement deepens and broadens support. Coordinated community outreach and education are key SACSI elements that increase the likelihood of success and long-term viability (Coldren et al. 2002). Community-capacity building was intended in part to address sustainability issues in the Comprehensive Gang Model. Given the low level of community mobilization implementation discussed above, it is perhaps not surprising that sustainability has been a vexing challenge for many of these initiatives.

Finally, it is important to ensure that efforts are evaluated and undergo consistent performance measurement. Howell (2010) found that gang programs that were sustained over the long term standardized and institutionalized data collection to show program outcomes. Substantiation of success through data resulted in the diffusions and federal investment in many of the crime reduction initiatives included in this review. Even in efforts such as CCIs, which due to their breadth and ambition are frequently difficult to measure because of the long time it takes to change areas such as education improvement, it is essential to measure progress in a formalized evaluation process to determine its efficacy (Miller and Burns 2006). Evaluation does not function only to secure external support. Data on initiative performance can be fed back into the effort to ensure continuous improvement. This allows an effort to recognize and address areas of low performance, improving outcomes, and making an initiative more worthy of being sustained.
Conclusion

As this review indicates, there is an impressive and extensive body of literature of effective place-based interventions as well as collaborative efforts to improve neighborhoods. Three broad points are important while considering how to draw from this literature in devising an effort for a specific jurisdiction and neighborhood:

- First, focusing the effort in terms of geographic area, population of interest, and crime or behavior type to be affected allows programs to deliver the greatest possible effect with the resources available.
- Second, when addressing a problem, it is critical to assess the local context and conditions to ensure that the tactics employed fit the local dynamics.
- Third, evaluations consistently find that how a collaborative effort structures itself and carries out its work is as important to its success as what programs or activities it uses.

Looking forward, it is important to remember that even successful strategies evolve over time. This review captures the state of knowledge in 2010. It would have been substantially different five years ago, and there will be important new findings that bear on collaborative neighborhood-based crime reduction efforts five years from now. To mention just a few relevant undertakings, David Kennedy is leading the National Network for Safe Communities at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, to refine, spread, support and guide research into the group violence strategies based on Boston Ceasefire and the DMI strategies that started in High Point, NC (www.nnscommunities.org). The White House Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative will fund integrated approaches to addressing neighborhood-level problems, including crime and disorder, and evaluate funded efforts to determine what works and develop best practices. The National Neighborhood Alliance launched in September 2010 as a voluntary collaboration of national, state, and local organizations that are supporting work in communities of concentrated poverty. Any initiative seeking to reduce crime and improve quality of life in troubled urban communities is part of a nationwide community of practice, and should continually use and contribute to the knowledge base that community of practice is collectively building.
References


Annotated Bibliography

General and Theoretical


Overview of how what is known about deterrence theory can be deployed to reduce crime and result in fewer resources devoted to punishment.


A review of the research on the connection between employment and criminal behavior. Both theories suggesting a link between work and crime and different stages in the life course and statistical approaches to specifying those relationships are discussed. Discussion of the results is organized by work intensity and adolescent delinquency, job characteristics and crime, and unemployment and crime rates.


Highly influential piece on the relationship between crime and disorder, and the need for policing strategies to be correspondingly attentive to place (not just individually reported crimes) and particularly to neighborhoods at the “tipping point” where disorder begins to foster increased crime.

Overviews of Multiple Program or Strategies


A searchable database including evidence-based prevention and intervention programs targeting youth. Covers prevention, immediate sanctions, intermediate sanctions, residential programs, and reentry. Programs are rated exemplary, effective or promising, depending on the robustness, extent, and consistency of findings on effectiveness. Extensive information on content and evaluation is available for included programs.


Presents the result of a review of over 800 violence prevention programs, identifying
those rated as model or promising programs. Criteria are evidence of deterrent effect with strong research design, sustained effects, and multiple site replication. Analysis of mediating effects and cost/benefit analyses are also considered. Program summaries and contact information for selected programs are available. The site also identifies programs that had been included but were later removed due to negative or mixed findings in further research studies.


This bulletin discusses results from a meta-analysis on over 200 intervention programs for serious juvenile offenders. The authors found positive and consistent evidence for the following programs for non-institutionalized juveniles who are serious offenders: individual counseling, interpersonal skills, and behavioral programs.


The Matrix is a visual tool that groups studies of policing interventions by three crime prevention dimensions: specificity of prevention mechanism, type/scope of target, and level of proactivity. Study results are categorized as non-significant, successful, mixed results, or harmful (“backfire”). The Matrix can also be parsed by level of rigor in the included studies.


Argues that multiple factors had no influence on the homicide rate, including: abortion laws, aging of the population, shifts in the drug market, community policing (CAPS program), the economy, gun availability, incarceration, increased police force and budget, and lethality of violence. Factors that probably did play a role are: new police activities (directed patrols, surveillance cameras, and specialized gang units), aggressive prosecution strategies (PSN), and violence prevention programs (CeaseFire), and possibly population displacement.


This study works backwards – identifying cities with lower homicide and robbery trends, and then exploring what these cities are doing – to understand effective policing strategies. Results indicate that in Chicago there were too many simultaneous efforts and programs (Compstat, PSN, community policing, camera technology) to distinguish which
might be the most influential. But in general, Chicago uses problem solving, data driven approaches, working partnerships (including resource sharing), accountability and technological advances in their violent crime interventions. In Tampa: “Whatever its ultimate source, cooperation and collaboration seem deeply engrained in the attitudes, values, and working relationships within the local CJ system.” In Topeka, the police department emphasized transparency and partnerships to increase the negative and hopeless image of crime, especially through a Safe Streets initiative (www.safestreets.org) that takes a data-driven approach to narrow in on preventable crimes (e.g., drive-offs where people steal gasoline). In El Monte, the police department created a Community Relations Office that provides referrals and services (such as free counseling, job assistance, etc.). This department also had a unique strategy to increase community participation in meetings – block off a road, turn on vehicle lights, and knock on doors to ask residents to participate out on the street.

Overall, formal or informal partnerships existed across sites, with regular data analysis procedures to target crimes. Each site had decentralized police departments (so police can focus on specific neighborhoods), which increased information sharing and accountability. In addition, all of the cities utilized schools as a main location for resources and had strong leadership. However, without a systematic assessment, it is unclear how these similarities are actually related to the low crime levels in each city.


This article analyzes the impacts of three policing interventions: New York’s Compstat, Boston’s Operation Ceasefire, and Virginia’s Project Exile. Using growth-curve analysis from data representing the 95 largest US cities, the authors conclude that Project Exile had the most promising impact, although the effect may have been small. They caution that Boston’s homicide reduction needs to be considered in light of a small sample size, and that New York’s homicide rates did not differ significantly from other cities in the 1990s.


This report reviews a variety of firearm and violence studies, and this Committee to Improve Research Information and Data on Firearms specifically addresses the strengths and limitations of past research in this area. Therefore, this provides a critical perspective on intervention programs that have been adopted widely or well-rated, and challenges the actual impacts many of these programs have on violence rates.

**Comprehensive Gang Model**

**COMPREHENSIVE GANG MODEL - BACKGROUND**


These pieces provide extensive literature reviews and indicate the research and theory underpinning Irving Spergel’s work, which eventually resulted in OJJDP’s Comprehensive Gang Model (often referred to as the “Spergel Model”). The nature of the gang problem, techniques used by various agencies, and a suggested alternative approach are the primary focus of these articles and books.

**OJJDP/Spergel Model Evaluations**


In this book, Spergel discussed implementation and outcomes of a comprehensive approach to reducing youth gang violence in the Little Village neighborhood of Chicago, from 1992-1997. This community-based model uses theoretically driven components (such as providing opportunities to socially disadvantaged youth) to address the gang problem. The Little Village Project primarily targeted 200 individuals (mostly youth 17-24) from two of the most violent gangs in the neighborhood. The main goals were to reduce youth gang crime and violence in specific communities and increase the community’s ability to conduct prevention, suppression, and intervention through five main strategies: community mobilization, opportunities provision, social intervention, suppression, and organizational change.

Using a quasi-experimental design, Spergel found overall positive reviews for the individual, gang/group, and community level. He found it was well implemented and according to self-report data, there were decreases in serious violent and property crimes and reduced frequency of offenses for other crime types; there was also an increase in education and employment levels, with employment found to link to a decrease in

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1 This model stems from Social Disorganization, Differential Association, Opportunity, Anomie, and Social Control theories. See Spergel, Wa, and Sosa (2003: 1.5) for an overview of this research.
individual criminal activity (notably drug selling). Compared to control groups, program clients had significantly reduced overall violent crime and drug arrests compared to those receiving some or those receiving no services, although the program did not impact total, property, or minor arrests. There was an increase in homicides/other serious violent gang crime in the target area (pre/post), but the rate was lower than other gangs in the area and was less than the increase in other surrounding communities. The perception of crime was also lower in the target area than pre-program perceptions. Overall, Spergel found that suppression (especially police), job placements and referrals, school referrals (especially by youth workers), and program dosage were the four most successful programs/services.


This chapter is a summary of findings from six sites (Little Village, Mesa, Riverside, Bloomington-Normal, San Antonio, and Tucson) that were funded to implement the OJJDP model from 1995 to 2000. Data were collected at the individual youth, program worker, and organizational levels, in addition to gang, family, and community levels.

Although the core program elements were not fully implemented at any site, Little Village, Riverside, and Mesa had the most successful implementations. In general, these three sites had high levels of coordination, lower levels of individual and community-level gang-related violence, and were generally found to be effective. Compared to a control group, gang members had a significantly reduced number of violent crime arrests in the targeted areas. The OJJDP model appeared to address gang-related violence more effectively than other types of delinquency or crime.

Key indicators of success included: strong government leaderships (city and county); an interagency street team (including a project coordinator, police, PO, parole officer, outreach worker, and social service providers) that uses former gang members; strong coordination among social intervention, suppression, and opportunities (including relationships among probation, police, and outreach workers); and the development of a steering committee.


After successful findings in Little Village, OJJDP funded and implemented the Spergel model in five additional sites including Riverside, CA. Mesa, AZ and Riverside were the most successful. The Riverside program targeted 150 gang-involved and high-risk youth (defined as individuals ages 12 to 22) from two communities. Most were from referred from probation, which impacted the services provided (for example, probation officers provided certain case management functions). Compared to youth not receiving services,
program youth had a reduction in arrest rates and self-reported offenses in several categories, and the program was not just successful for gang involved youth, but worked for delinquent youth as well. Successful aspects of the program included: buy in and commitment from stakeholders, employment training/preparation and job placement programs, and a balance in services provided.


After successful findings in Little Village, OJJDP funded and implemented the Spergel model in five additional sites including Mesa, AZ. Mesa and Riverside, CA were the most successful, and the Mesa Gang Intervention Project lasted 5 years. The evaluation compared non-program youth from three gang-problem comparison areas to Mesa program youth. Pre/post regressions controlled for youth demographics, gang membership status, the amount of time a youth was exposed to the program, and prior arrest history to determine what impacts total arrests. Compared to youth not receiving services, program youth had a reduction in arrest rates and self-reported offenses in several categories. In Mesa, youth-associated crime rates decreased by 10 percent compared to the average rates in three comparison areas. Program youth had decreased arrests (by 18 percent) over the four year period. However, the intervention did not significantly reduce gang membership. The most significant factors included prior total arrests, program effects, and community/institutional collaboration. Social intervention services were the most important component overall (over suppression, number of contacts with suppression or non-suppression staff, and total services measures). A high level of services was related to higher educational success, and staying in school was related to a decrease in the total arrest rate. However, the level of services received only mattered for the highest risk youth, where the highest dosage was significant in lowering arrest rates.


These reports are on three of the five main OJJDP gang model evaluations. These sites did not have positive findings in impact evaluations, which has primarily been attributed to the following: weak implementation of the program model (with many critical
components missing), a lack of collaboration with other organizations, limited programs/services available to youth, and a generalized strategy across sites/youth.

**IMPLEMENTATION GUIDES**


Based on a synthesis of lesson learned from OJJDP model program sites, *Best Practices To Address Community Gang Problems* presents recommendations and a detailed strategic plan for the Comprehensive (OJJDP) Gang Model based on a national survey and lessons learned from practitioners. The recommendations include: convening a steering committee consisting of both upper management and other groups with influence in the community, using a data-driven approach, finding the right lead agency and project director, comprehensively assessing the gang problem, planning for implementation using assessment results and creating a strategic plan (including activities, goals, and objectives), fully implementing the program, selecting appropriate program activities, and sustaining the program over time. The assessment guide lays out specific steps for practitioners looking to carry out the data-driven assessment approach of the model.

**Boston Ceasefire**


In this article, Kennedy argues that deterrence can be an effective strategy, if properly implemented. He provides the following advice for the pulling levers strategy upon which Boston Ceasefire was based: select a target audience (he gives the example of gang violence); create a diverse multiagency team; send a direct and clear deterrence message to a small assembled group; follow through, especially with regular project team meetings; stay in touch with those who received the message; and when ready, select a new target.


These pieces are about the development, implementation, and evaluation of Boston Ceasefire. The program follows a deterrence model, and aims to “control and deter serious violence” (Braga et al. 2001b: 200). It began in the mid-1990s and targets chronic offending, gang-involved youth (ages 24 and under). Three main strategies include: the intense focus on the enforcement of gun trafficking, pulling levers (the strategy of targeting gangs involved in violence, reaching out to specific gangs and explicitly communicating a deterrence message to them, and “pulling every lever” in terms of criminal justice sanctions when violence does occur), and social service interventions.

Before a formal evaluation was ever conducted, Boston Ceasefire was highly ranked as an effective program, and the reduction in homicides in Boston (from 44 per year between 1991-1995 to 26 in 1996, 15 in 1997, and a continual trend through 1999) was attributed to the intervention. This evaluation used a one-group, time series analysis and a nonrandomized quasi-experimental design. Results from the evaluation (Braga et al., 2001a) indicate a 63-percent decrease in monthly youth homicides, a 32-percent reduction in monthly calls about shots fired, a 25-percent decrease in monthly Boston gun assaults, and a 44-percent decrease in monthly youth gun assaults in one district.

The authors note challenges with data collection and comparison data, and describe their study as “very much a ‘black box’ evaluation.” The evaluators also note that “…it is necessary to draw on the research literature on gang intervention programs to speculate on the effectiveness of the Operation Ceasefire approach to controlling gang violence.”


The Kennedy practice brief presents the role that addressing norms and narratives plays in carrying out the strategies of the National Network for Safe Communities, which are based on Boston Ceasefire and the High Point DMI. Both communities plagued by crime and violence and the agencies that police them have norms and narratives that can exacerbate the problems that both want to solve. The brief discusses the way these norms and narratives are often constructed, and specific practices that have occurred in communities implementing the NNSC strategies to break them down and harness the power of norms and narratives to reduce violence and close down overt drug markets.

The group enforcement action brief presents similar information regarding the group enforcement action element of the Ceasefire strategy.

This article takes a specific focus on the strong community-police relations – most notably with the Ten Point Coalition (a group of active black ministers) – during the Boston Ceasefire intervention. The goal of the paper is to highlight the successes achieved during the 1990s and redirect efforts to reduce youth levels of violence in Boston once again.

**Drug Market Intervention (DMI)**


The Kennedy and Wong report provides an overview of the High Point, NC DMI program. The authors report a dramatic change in the status of an overt drug market in the target area, which they report “vanished literally overnight” (16). This report also documents the experiences of other jurisdictions that subsequently adopted the High Point model, and concludes that the DMI model – which was in the process of rolling out to nine cities at the time of this publication – is a promising approach to shutting down drug markets while still maintaining positive relationships among law enforcement agencies and the community. The full evaluation report captures the findings of the process and impact evaluation of the High Point DMI. It found that the impact of the DMI on violent crime was “immediate” (112), with declines of 75 percent at the 50 day mark post-intervention, 40 percent at 150 days, and 56 percent at 200 days. Violent crime declines remained after four years. Among the implementation findings were a number of community engagement, suggesting that community residents were empowered by the intervention, could assist in deterring criminal behaviors, and that negative norms may have shifted in a positive direction.


The DMI project is a place-based approach designed to eliminate drug markets in High Point, NC, which should then have the effect of reduced crime and violence. DMI is based on principles and concepts from Boston Ceasefire and PSN. Although a formal evaluation is still underway, preliminary results indicate the open-air drug market disappeared in all four target areas without any displacement effects.
Using a pulling-levers strategy for open-air drug markets combined with a problem-oriented policing approach, this Rockford, Illinois site attempted to reduce and prevent youth violence, gun violence, and gang violence. Results from an impact evaluation indicate statistically significant reductions in crime, drug, and other offenses in the targeted location.

This report presents findings from an independent evaluation of the Nashville Drug Market Intervention over a five year period. Using a systematic time series analysis, the authors found a significant reduction in property crimes (28 percent), drug offenses (56 percent), drug equipment violations (37 percent), and calls-for-service (18 percent) after implementing the DMI. The authors also conclude that there was not a negative diffusion effect (and possibly even a beneficial diffusion) and that the target area experienced significantly higher declines in these offense categories than comparison areas (which also experienced some reductions).

This report presents findings from an evaluation of the New Hope Initiative in Winston-Salem, NC. The author found that calls for service declined by 22 percent and Uniform Crime Report (UCR) Part I crimes fell by 11.5 percent one year after the intervention, but all offenses increased 32.3 percent during the same time period and UCR Part I violent crime remained steady.

This NIJ Journal article is based off an NIJ conference presentation about the Drug Market Intervention (DMI) program, and specifically the High Point program. This reference provides background information and summary findings on the High Point program.

**Chicago CeaseFire**


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CeaseFire Chicago is a violence prevention program with a public health model framework that began in 1999. Instead of targeting “the behavior of a large number of individuals,” it focused on “risky activities.” Results indicate that “the program grew noticeably safer in six of the seven sites,” with “evidence that decreases in the size and intensity of shooting hot spots were linked to the introduction of Cease Fire in four of these [seven] areas [that were evaluated]” (ES-17).

Effective strategies include using outreach workers to provide counseling and services to clients; using resources, staff, and organizations that already exist within a community; and providing some level of professional training to outreach workers. Faith-based communities were considered “one of Ceasefire’s most important local partners” (ES-15) and law enforcement was a common collaborator for information sharing and providing assistance for events (although there were often tensions between police and street workers). Large organizations reportedly worked well because they had strong financial histories and more security in their operations (leading to a higher likelihood of sustainability); however, they also had limited networking. Challenges included fidelity to the program model, implementation delays, conflicting issues, and competition.

**Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI)**


These SACSI pieces provide background and general results of the SACSI initiative. Based on the success of the Boston Ceasefire Initiative, SACSI was designed by the Department of Justice to combine the efforts of researchers and practitioners (combining theory and practice) to reduce violent crime rates. The basis was for researchers to use their expertise to develop a framework for what was needed in the targeted area/populations, while practitioners could then actively use their skills to execute the strategies laid out by the researchers. SACSI originally had 5 pilot cities (funded in 1998): Winston Salem, NC; New Haven, CT; Indianapolis, IN; Portland, OR; and Memphis, TN. In 2000, the following SACSI sites were added: Albuquerque, Atlanta, Detroit, Rochester (New York), and St. Louis. Each SACSI site initiated the SACSI process because targeted crimes in each site had come to surpass the state or national
average. The ultimate goal for all SACSI sites was to reduce the rates of specific crimes (mostly violent, or precursors to violent crimes) to rates that were below state and/or national averages.

Indicators of success: strong leadership from the US Attorney’s Office, multiagency partnerships, following a SARA model of problem solving, and balancing suppression and crime prevention all appeared to be linked to successful SACSI sites. Dalton (2003), who was the project monitor for SACSI sites, noted several challenges these sites faced, including: fully implementing the model, understanding that SACSI is an ongoing process that needs to be continued even when successful outcomes are reached, and the recognition that SACSI is a large effort that requires a serious time commitment from those involved.


In Groff et al., an emphasis on data through SACSI (such as increased access to data; more useful data; and an expanded use of the data, such as geographical representations of information) was highlighted.


Each of these documents is a final report for one of the 10 SACSI sites. Goals within the Phase I targeted areas varied, and included homicide and serious violence (Indianapolis); rape, statutory rape, and sexual assaults (Memphis); gun violence, gun possession, and increased perceptions of public safety (New Haven); reduced youth violence in hot spots and less illegal gun distribution (Portland); and youth violent crime (Winston-Salem). Phase II sites focused on homicide and firearms violence (Albuquerque, Atlanta and St. Louis), firearms violence and violations (Detroit), and youth and firearms violence (Rochester).

Results differed by site, and indicated a 53 percent decrease in gun assaults in targeted areas and a 32 percent reduction in homicide citywide (Indianapolis), a large reduction (49 percent) in reported forcible rapes citywide (Memphis), a 32 percent decrease in violent gun crimes and 45 percent decrease in calls-for-service for shots fired (New Haven), a 58 percent decrease in juvenile robberies and 19 percent decrease in “juvenile incidents” (Winston-Salem), and a 42 percent decrease in homicide and 25 percent decrease in other violent crimes (Portland). The success of Phase I sites led to an extension of funding to five additional sites, and all 10 sites were successfully transitioned into Project Safe Neighborhood sites. Although Phase II sites had fewer successes, St. Louis had large reductions in targeted crimes compared to other parts of the city and comparison areas (specifically, homicides and gun assaults). Rochester’s SACSI program produced significant reductions in the homicide rate after program implementation, and a more in-depth analysis determined that homicide and victimization was concentrated geographically in the city.

Overall, several program/activity features were successful. Homicide and crime incident reviews were notably effective, and information sharing from street-level workers was critical for creating a strategic plan. Although the message of swift and severe punishment by law enforcement for any new instances of violence was reportedly successfully delivered by the sites that used pulling levers, recidivism rates of lever pulling attendees did not decrease in three of the cities. The fourth city to use lever pulling, Indianapolis, found a general deterrent effect, but attributed this not to the lever pulling meetings, but the increased presence of police and an increase in probation sweeps, police stops, and other police tactics used to reduce crime. Also, while partnership problems were not reported by SACSI teams, challenges included funding
amounts and a lack of adequate staffing. Phase I sites felt a full-time project coordinator was important for success, but Phase II sites did not have a full-time coordinator.

**Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN)**

**Evaluation Findings**


Using Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models in a national comparison of PSN cities (n= 82) and non-PSN cities (n= 170), McGarrell, Corsaro, Hipple, and Bynum (2010) found that cities that implemented PSN had modest but significant reductions in violent crime (compared to stable violent crime rates in the treatment groups). The authors also noted that “the evidence seems to suggest that the multi-agency, focused deterrence, problem solving approach holds promise for reducing levels of violent crime” (pg 1).


These two pieces are related and both evaluate Chicago’s PSN program, which was established in 2002. In the research brief, neighborhoods in Chicago were targeted by analyzing homicide rates throughout the city, and groups (age, race, and gender) that were the highest risk for being an offender or victim were also identified through data analyses. Intervention efforts were targeted to these identified groups with a main goal of altering attitudes and norms towards gun violence. Program overviews were provided for law enforcement strategies, community outreach sessions, offender notification meetings, and reentry programs. Using a quasi-experimental design, the evaluation team found that neighborhood homicide rates decreased (compared to control areas and the rest of the city and pre- and post-). Specific elements were also correlated to decreased homicides, including offender notification meetings (which had the greatest effect), increased federal prosecutions, and the number of guns recovered.

The authors of the 2007 article also utilize a quasi-experimental design to evaluate increased federal prosecutions for convicted felons carrying or using guns, the length of sentences associated with federal prosecutions, supply-side firearm policing activities, and deterrence/social norm messages in offender notification meetings. A main conclusion is that emphasizing individual deterrence and social norm messages and increasing perceived legitimacy of the program are related to decreases in homicide rates in Chicago.

- Papachristos, A. V., Meares, T. L., and J. Fagan. 2009 “Why Do Criminals Obey the Law? The Influence of Legitimacy and Social Networks on Active Gun Offenders.”
These pieces supplement the research brief and evaluation reports by focusing on the offender’s perception of legitimacy in Chicago’s PSN program. They provide support for having clear, direct messages for those targeted at the offender notification meetings, since offenders are found to comply more often when they believe in the substance of the law and the legitimacy of legal actors.


In this article, Braga and his colleagues report impact evaluation findings from Lowell, MA, which implemented a pulling levers strategy in their PSN site. Results indicate that this strategy was linked to a statistically significant reduction in the number of gun homicide and gun-aggravated assault incidents (measured monthly). This finding held when comparing Lowell to other major cities in the state.


This case study reviews the city of Lowell’s PSN program, which according to the authors had a well implemented program. The assessment team found a 28 percent decline in aggravated assaults with a firearm compared to other cities in Massachusetts, although there were not reductions in other crimes, such as (gun) armed robberies or gun-related calls-for-service.


This final report details on the development and implementation of the various components of PSN, and also research findings on the impact of PSN on gun crime and the local level. Two of sites based their PSN approaches on a Project Exile model (Mobile and Montgomery, AL) and five were based more on a Boston Ceasefire and SACS model (Durham, Greensboro, and Winston-Salem, NC; Lowell, MA; and St. Louis). Mobile and Montgomery reported significant decreases in gun crimes compared to property crime trends, while the remaining cities had declines in gun crimes compared to control group areas (although Mobile’s reductions were not significant and St. Louis’ could not be compared to the control areas, since both had drops in the crime rate).

**CASE STUDIES AND IMPLEMENTATION TOOLS**

- Institute for Law and Justice. 2005. *Engaging the Community in Project Safe*
The focus of this report is community engagement in PSN, using lessons learned from past programs. A self assessment questionnaire is included as an appendix. Suggested efforts for engaging the community include: community forums; publicizing the program (e.g., visual displays, door-to-door information sharing, sponsoring PSN events, presenting at other organizations’ meetings, or outreach); involving practitioners, youth and families (e.g., home visits, hosting programs), community/faith-based organizations (e.g., rallies, vigils, and hosting events), and businesses/ foundations (partnering to create sport teams or a nonprofit that directly supports PSN); and engaging with the reentry population.


Case screenings increased in popularity in PSN sites. A team review of cases and cooperation among agencies is a critical aspect of successful case reviews. Those involved in the process often include: US Attorney’s Office, local/state prosecution, local law enforcement, federal law enforcement, probation/parole, and research partners. Convening all of the partners at the table regularly is noted as a major challenge, in addition to the large amount of time and effort this program consumes. Trust, an integrated partnership process, and continual feedback are all key aspects of a successful implementation.


Successful implementation strategies include: selecting the “right” partners for the project (those committed to the project), having a balance between suppression and social services, targeting high-risk individuals for the offender notification meetings, following through on promises and threats made to offenders, and disseminating the deterrence message widely (not just in meetings).


Crime incident reviews rely on collaborations between front line staff and project management, with law enforcement, prosecutors, and probation and parole officers involved in the process. Corrections staff, welfare or other social service agencies, ballistics experts, outreach workers, researchers, and community members are sometimes involved also. Uniform Crime Report (UCR) data are often used for aggregate crime rate comparisons. Some PSN jurisdictions also use the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS), the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ (ATF) National Tracing Center data, or local law enforcement data when targeting. Strong partnerships, collaborations, project
staff commitment, and a clear data-driven process are necessary for success.


Carrying out an effective targeting strategy for constructing a violent gun offender list can pull from multiple sources, including local arrest records, state criminal histories, law enforcement intelligence, and incident reviews. For other aspects of PSN, jurisdictions sometimes selected specific criteria (such as having two or more felony convictions, being a documented gang member, youth known to be involved in drugs, etc.)


The guide is designed for jurisdictions looking to implement PSN. Strategies for beginning a new PSN initiative include: coordinating agencies (sharing the same goals, being involved in programs together, sharing data and resources, and having an overall comprehensive, coordinated response), coordinating among initiatives (coordinating with existing gun violence or other related law enforcement task forces or programs), holding regularly scheduled meetings (which includes having communication devices for all partners), and having a strong leader to push for collaboration and move the group forward. Other partnership strengthening issues include building trust, having equal opportunities to contribute and influence decisions made, commitment to the program, and integrating program goals and values into everyday activities.

**Weed and Seed**


The goal of the Weed and Seed initiative is to “weed out” offenders through intensive law enforcement, followed by “seeding” the community with prevention, intervention, and treatment services. This guidebook provides background on the program and explains the four fundamental principles of Weed and Seed: collaboration, coordination, community participation, and leveraging resources.


Nineteen cities were funded to implement Weed and Seed beginning in 1992. These two briefs are summaries of the process and impact evaluations of Weed and Seed. Main findings from the process evaluation include: there was more of an emphasis on weeding
than seeding across sites; there was an increase in sharing resources and coordination than normally occurred; community policing activities increased, which was beneficial to those communities; interagency cooperation was reportedly more common in law enforcement agencies than prosecutors offices; and of the seeding programs, sites tended to use primary prevention for younger youth and intervention services for older youth.

Main findings from the impact evaluation (which covered eight sites: Hartford, Connecticut; Manatee and Sarasota Counties, Florida; Shreveport, Louisiana; Las Vegas, Nevada; Akron, Ohio; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Salt Lake City, Utah; and Seattle, Washington) include: preexisting community factors (such as crime rates, relevant geographical features, and the social and institutional infrastructure) either make implementation easier or more difficult, and certain strategies were more successful, such as early seeding, sustained weeding, high-level task forces combined with community policing, focusing resources narrowly, having an active prosecutor, and bottom-up communication.


Eight Weed and Seed sites were part of a formal evaluation: Hartford, Connecticut; Salt Lake City, Utah; Manatee and Sarasota Counties, Florida; Seattle, Washington; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Shreveport, Louisiana; Las Vegas, Nevada; and Akron, Ohio.

Results indicated that Hartford and Pittsburgh had the most positive results of all of the evaluated Weed and Seed sites, with large decreases in Part 1 crime and increased perceptions of public safety. Manatee/Sarasota (North Manatee) and Shreveport exhibited “substantial evidence” of reduced Part 1 crimes; Seattle, Akron, Las Vegas (West Las Vegas), and Manatee/Sarasota (South Manatee) had slight indications of a reduction in
Part 1 crimes; and two sites (Salt Lake City and Las Vegas [Meadows Village]) did not have reductions in Part 1 crimes.

Preexisting partnerships in the community, areas with the potential for economic development, and stable (less transient) communities were the most successful Weed and Seed sites. Continuous and simultaneous activity (for weeding and seeding) is the best method to build community trust. Focusing and targeting resources to a narrower area was more successful for sites than less intense, spread out interventions. Finally, having leadership take a cooperative approach, using a bottom-up problem solving strategy, and promoting an equal role for law enforcement and community-based organizations are all positive strategies.


The Best Practices Series is a set of evaluations of Weed and Seed sites that complies lessons learned and success stories. These documents echo the findings in the formal evaluations about coordination, partnerships, developing a sustainability plan, and community engagement. As one site evaluator summarized, “The Weed and Seed story across the country is really about these successful partnerships” (Volume 2: 1).


This is a guidebook intended for practitioners implementing Weed and Seed. Specifically, this guidebook focuses on why community mobilization is important, and how the project team can engage community members and organizations.


This manual was designed for those implementing a Weed and Seed site in their jurisdiction, and includes an overview of the program’s goals and mission and provides suggestions for how to organize a steering committee and select sites, assess resources and needs, plan and manage a Weed and Seed site, mobilize the community and incorporate law enforcement (including community policing suggestions), select and implement program activities, and evaluate the program’s efforts.

This meta-analysis compiles findings from the individual evaluations. A few especially promising sites are highlighted, and the authors conclude that there are generally significant improvements in crime rates, significant improvements in the public’s perception of crime, and increased coordination and collaboration between participating agencies.

**Community Policing**


This document provides an overview of community policing, including strategies related to partnerships, organizational structure, staff and resources, and problem solving. Specifically, the SARA model (Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment) is described.


Authors surveyed 1,347 residents from 41 South Carolina neighborhoods in cities in which community policing efforts were in place, to determine whether tactics commonly associated with community policing (police presence in cars or on foot, neighborhood substations, and specific officers assigned to patrol neighborhoods) affected resident perceptions of police. They particularly focused on effects regarding trust and legitimacy of the police. Multivariate regression analysis found that police visibility was associated with greater perception of police effectiveness and trust in the police, while contact with police and resident knowledge of community policing tactics being utilized in their neighborhoods were not significantly associated with either perceptions of effectiveness or trust.


In a review of effective police practices, these authors argue for place-based, strategic approaches to law enforcement. While they find support for community policing for a reduction in fear of crime, reductions to crime and disorder are linked to problem-oriented policing practices. Overall, most of the policing research does not allow for strong conclusions in this area.


This article reports findings from a systematic Campbell review on problem-oriented policing and its effectiveness in reducing crime and disorder. Narrowing from 5,500 studies to the 10 that are methodologically rigorous, the authors find a slight reduction in
crime and disorder through problem-oriented policing. Pre-post studies, although they have weaker methodologies, find a very strong improvement when problem-oriented policing is employed.


This report assesses the community policing efforts in Oakland, California through a Problem Solving Officer (PSO) program. Data included web-based surveys of PSOs, data on the deployment and coverage of PSOs, official crime data, and interviews/focus groups with PSO staff. The researchers found that although there have been improvements in the implementation of the program, there were no significant reductions in crime or violence. They explore explanations for this and provide policy recommendations.

**Reentry**


Presented as an update to a 2001 systematic review of evidence-based adult correction programs, this report summarizes findings from 291 studies with strong methodologies and conducted within the past 35 years. The report was prepared for policy recommendation purposes for the Washington State Legislature. While a variety of program types are discussed, the authors generally conclude that evidence-based approaches are the most promising option for reducing recidivism rates.


Lays out a framework for implementing evidence-based practice for community corrections agencies (include probation and parole). Eight principles of effective intervention to reduce recidivism are the backbone of the approach.


This journal article provides evaluation findings for the Boston Reentry Initiative (BRI), an interagency program aimed at reducing recidivism rates by successfully integrating returning inmates into the community through individualized service plans, social services, and vocational training both during the individual’s incarceration and when the person is released from prison. Using a quasi-experimental design and survival analyses,
evaluators found significant decreases in both total and violent arrest failure rates for program participants (compared to a control group).


This magazine article provides an overview of the federal funding system for prisoner reentry and discusses the changing federal reentry initiatives. Lattimore recommends the federal government adopt a basic model and continue to refine that model, including providing states with technical assistance to determine which practices are best in different jurisdictions.


The Serious and Violent Offender Reentry Initiative (SVORI) provided comprehensive services to returning prisoners, including education, employment, medical care, and housing. In a 2009 impact evaluation of twelve adult and four juvenile sites (or 2,391 individuals), participants had increased levels of services received, although the number who needed services was still higher than the number who reported receiving services. The authors conclude that there were “modest” outcomes overall for this initiative.


This report presents extensive information, policy statements, and recommendations from a variety of reentry experts to promote more effective methods of addressing the issue of reentry.


This final report evaluates the impact and cost/benefit of the Maryland Reentry Partnership Initiative (REP) in Baltimore between 2001-2005. Comparing 229 REP participants to 370 returning prisoners in Baltimore but outside of the REP-eligible area, evaluators found that the program was linked to a notable reduction in overall criminal activities and in homicides specifically.

In this congressional testimony of “what works” in reentry, Travis provides background on the issues involved in the field of reentry, discusses the link between returning prisoners and public safety, reviews previous evidence on public safety programs (and discusses which have been effective), and recommends four promising innovations. These innovations include offender notification meetings (as found in PSN programs), comprehensive and interagency initiatives (as in the Boston Reentry Initiative), coordinated services through reentry courts, and community-based intervention programs.


This article provides an overview of the Urban Institute’s *Returning Home: Understanding the Challenges of Prisoner Reentry* program and present initial findings, including who returns home from prison, who supports these returning individuals upon their return, and the various challenges they face. Visher also provides several policy recommendations and lessons learned from the study.

**Gang Reduction Program (GRP)**


The Gang Reduction Program (GRP) was a multi-year, multi-site OJJDP sponsored comprehensive program operating from 2003 to 2007. The GRP sites were Los Angeles, California; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; North Miami Beach, Florida; and Richmond, Virginia. The process evaluation included observations, individual and small group interviews, and a web survey of site coordinators. The outcome evaluation focused on community-level – not individual – changes. Time series analyses and a pre/post comparison were used.

GRP impacts were mixed, and the Los Angeles site was the only area to experience a decrease in crime rates after GRP was implemented. Specifically, serious violence, gang related incidents, gang-related serious violence, and reported shots fired were reduced after the program was implemented. Although levels of coordination and communication varied across sites, all of the sites displayed success with program implementation and three of the four had plans to sustain the program in the future in place.

**Gang Interventions--General**


Tita and Papachristos cover the ways in which policy responses to gangs have changed since the 1940s, with a particular focus on policing strategies and “Hybrid Models” involving comprehensive and problem-solving approaches, including Spergel Model efforts, Boston Ceasefire and PSN. Howell’s 2000 report summarizes past gang intervention programs, while his chapter covers lessons learned from the various types of gang interventions. Effective strategies include full program implementation, time spent in the program (with clients who spend more time in the program having more successful outcomes), balanced programs (a combination of prevention, intervention, suppression, and reentry for incarcerated gang members), having the intervention team and outreach workers serve as the main service delivery component in a comprehensive model, standardized and institutionalized data collection and accessible data, and organized and engaged leaders.


This book contains a variety of information on the gang problem, gang intervention programs to address these issues, methodological issues with past studies, lessons learned from the comprehensive gang model, and potential future research in the gang field. This source provides a good overview of some of the main themes and issues considered in the literature review.


This report summarizes strategies to reduce gang violence. It discusses PSN, anti-gang taskforces, information sharing, and other prevention and education efforts. Provides a good overview of government-sponsored programs.


The SARA model is a problem solving model. SARA involves Scanning to identify problems, conducting Analysis to gather a deeper understanding of the problem, a Response is chosen and implemented, and an evaluation (or Assessment) is conducted. The 1997 report walks through the four steps of SARA and contains a worksheet for practitioners in Appendix C to assist with the implementation of the model.

Both reports describe how the Comprehensive Gang Initiative Demonstration applies a problem solving method to a comprehensive gang model. This model is different than the OJJDP comprehensive gang model (although both address gang issues). This comprehensive model attempts to combine preventative and crime control strategies for drug trafficking and related gang crimes. Key components of the gang initiative program model include: a focus on harmful behaviors, continuous diagnosis of problems, coordinated response, monitored performance, evaluating the impact, and adapting to change. The framework must be adaptable (able to apply the model to multiple types of gangs), flexible (must allow for necessary modifications), and multifaceted (working with multiagency partners and the community).


Unlike other gang models, this model focuses almost exclusively on enforcement and prosecution. Pulling from lessons learned in various sites (including Tucson, AZ; San Diego, CA; Atlanta, GA; Ft. Wayne, IN; Kansas City, MO; Kings County [Brooklyn], NY; New York, NY; and New York County [Manhattan], NY), there are six main strategies: planning and analysis, having gang information systems, using gang data to inform strategies, interagency cooperation, legal strategies (pushing for the strictest charges available), and evaluations to assess the development process and effectiveness.

**Case Management**


This chapter discusses wraparound service provision, including misconceptions, the theory behind the intervention strategy, and essential elements for an effective wraparound strategy. The authors also compare wraparound service provision with other case management approaches and review promising findings from quasi-experimental studies and randomized clinical trials.

**Mental Health**

This congressional testimony was presented by the Director of SAMHSA Center for Mental Health Services. Arons discusses the issues surrounding mental health, background on jail diversion programs, successful components of these programs and studies on effectiveness, how the SAMHSA initiative expands on previous efforts, potential challenges, and recommendations.


In this article, the author describes the challenges and issues concerning homeless mentally ill individuals. Belcher argues that mentally ill persons are often criminalized instead of receiving needed mental health care, and he provides recommendations for reducing the involvement of the mentally ill in the criminal justice system.


The authors review the link between mental health and the juvenile criminal justice system, calling jail systems “surrogate mental hospitals” (4). They discuss several problems in the current system, including inadequate screenings; a lack of funding, staffing, inter-agency collaborations; and a missing knowledge base on this issue. In addition to addressing these obstacles, various diversion options are suggested.


This is a Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report highlighting self-reported figures on mental health status for those in prisons, jails, or on probation. The author found that 16 percent of state prisoners identified as mentally ill, supporting previous findings that there are more mentally ill persons involved in the criminal justice system than in the broader community.


This article reviews the “criminalization” perspective and the efforts to provide mental health services to individuals who need them to reduce crime rates. This work extends these previous efforts by suggesting a broader targeting of risk factors to prevent arrests.


This document introduces a blueprint framework for juvenile justice and mental health systems to implement when attempting to merge these two areas. After summarizing best practices, the blueprint provides recommendations and practical examples for practitioners.


This report touches on the mentally ill population in jails, including a discussion of the worst county/state programs, best county/state programs, and recommendations. The authors discuss a variety of mental health and jail system issues based primarily on survey results from family and friends of mentally ill individuals who were members of an advocacy organization and survey data from approximately 1,400 jail officials.


This article focuses more specifically on juvenile delinquents and treatment programs for those who are mentally ill. Although 75 studies are reviewed, the authors find obstacles with the quality/rigor of many of these evaluations. Overall they find that most treatment programs focus on conduct and behavioral problems of juveniles.

Substance Abuse


NREPP is a searchable online database of more than 160 interventions in the areas of mental health, substance abuse prevention, and mental health and substance abuse prevention. The database presents a summary of each included intervention, and a rating of the quality of research support and the readiness of available program materials to be used for program dissemination. However, unlike similar databases of interventions included in this bibliography, NREPP does not rate the programs themselves, and inclusion in NREPP does not imply that they are “model” or otherwise endorsed interventions.


This guidebook was created in response to increasing levels of juvenile violence and is intended as a resource for practitioners interested in adopting prevention and intervention treatments for juveniles in the justice system. In particular, the risk factor chart (see Figure 2, “Risk Factors for Health and Behavior Problems”) was reviewed for the substance abuse section in the literature review.


The authors in this study conducted a synthesize of evidence-based drug treatment programs. To do so, they identified five reports that ranked prevention programs, narrowed the prevention programs to those that considered effectiveness, and qualitatively identified 10 themes in common across studies. Specifically, they noted the following elements that effective programs typically have in common: attention towards psychosocial risk factors believed to spark or maintain substance abuse; a focus on alcohol and tobacco, based on the assumptions of the gateway drug hypothesis; targeting multiple influences (such as peers and parents) and settings; targeting youth through multiple grades in school (or enough dosage); tailoring the program based on age, culture, and context; having sufficient resources; a focus on social skills for youth and discipline for parents; having a bottom-up, multi-agency decision-making project team; and using certain strategies (such as high quality staff or promoting the program in the community) to increase program sustainability.

Employment

PLACE-BASED INITIATIVES


The Jobs-Plus Community Revitalization Initiative for Public Housing Families (Jobs-Plus) program was a demonstration program implemented in public housing projects in six cities (Dayton, OH; Los Angeles, CA; St. Paul, MN; Seattle, WA; Baltimore, MD and Chattanooga, TN). Launched in 1998, it was supported by a consortium of public and private funders, led by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Rockefeller Foundation. Jobs-Plus provided employment and training services to all working-age, non-disabled residents, and included three main components: 1) employment-related services and activities; 2) financial incentives to work through modified rent rules; and 3) community support for work, which sought to strengthen social ties among residents in ways that would help support their job preparation and work efforts. For all of the six sites, the program produced positive impacts on residents’
earnings, driven largely by large and sustained impacts in the three sites (Dayton, Los Angeles, and St. Paul) was implementation was most complete.


The Neighborhood Jobs Initiative sought to transform economically distressed neighborhoods by substantially increasing residents’ employment rates. Launched in 1998, it was implemented in low-income neighborhoods in Washington, DC; Chicago, IL; New York City, NY; Hartford, CT; and Fort Worth, TX. It was supported by a consortium of funders, including the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Chase Manhattan Foundation. NJI did not have a formal model of service delivery and was not rigorously evaluated, but its findings do point to the efficacy of focusing on neighborhoods as a means to reach the working poor and other low-income populations, especially focusing on stable neighborhoods.


New Hope, implemented in 1994 in two low-income neighborhoods in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, was based on the premise that people who work full time should not be poor. The project provided full-time workers with an earnings supplement to raise their income above poverty, low-cost health insurance, and subsidized child care. For those unable to find full-time work, the program offered job placement assistance and referral to a wage-paying community service job if necessary. Economic effects on employment and income lasted during the three years of the program, but the provision of work supports continued to have a range of positive effects on low-income families and children five years after the program’s end.

**TRANSITIONAL JOBS**


Transitional jobs are short-term, subsidized community service jobs for individuals with barriers to employment who are unable to find a job in the regular labor market. The jobs provide a paycheck, training and mentoring, work experience, and employer references. Several studies of welfare recipients and others with barriers to employment found that participants showed improved earnings and employment outcomes after participating in a transitional jobs program.

The Center for Employment Opportunities (CEO) in New York City operates a transitional jobs program for former prisoners to help them successfully transition back into the community and avoid further criminal activity. An interim report from a rigorous evaluation finds that the program reduces recidivism and sharply increases formal employment and earnings in the short-term, due to the subsidized employment. However, participants still faced difficulty finding unsubsidized employment, suggesting that the subsidized jobs may need to last longer, the use of earnings supplements to encourage sustained employment in low-wage jobs, increased training, or other approaches.

**YOUTH SERVICE AND CONSERVATION CORPS**


Conservation and youth service corps program serve out-of-school youth between the ages of 18 and 25. They help young people enter the labor market by providing basic education, soft and hard skills training, and mentorship within the context of a community service job. Participants carry out service projects to fill an unmet community need and receive a stipend. An evaluation found that corps members were more likely to be employed and work more hours and were less likely to be arrested. Effects were particularly positive for young African-American men.


This is a guide written primarily for practitioners with a focus on low-income youth attempting to obtain and maintain employment. This document provides a summary of promising practices, with a focus on the National Association of Service and Conservation (the funder’s) Corps’ Corps-to-Career (CtC) Initiative in addition to an overview of general programs. The authors then provide suggestions and recommendations for implementing a similar program in a community.

**School-Based Interventions**

**GANG RESISTANCE EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROGRAM**


Esbensen et al. summarize the findings from the national evaluation of G.R.E.A.T., an anti-gang education program delivered in schools in 11 cities, primarily to middle-school students. The program was intended to teach students life skills and help them avoid gang membership and delinquency. The evaluation, a longitudinal study of the program in six cities found promising initial result in terms of positive changes in attitudes, but no statistically significant differences between program participants and non-participants after two years. After four years, participants exhibited more positive social attitudes than non-participants, indicating that there may be lagged effects of the program. The 2009 School Personnel Survey Report surveyed school personnel (n = 230) in seven locations across the country to determine perceptions of the G.R.E.A.T. program from those administering it. There were generally positive reactions to the program, and a large emphasis on the importance of the relationship between the law enforcement officer and school personnel. Recommendations resulted from the survey, the G.R.E.A.T curriculum was revamped, and evaluation of the new effort is underway.

**SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICERS**


Abt Associates assessed the implementation process for 19 SRO programs (including on-site visits and phone interviews). The SRO role involves enforcing the law, teaching students, and mentoring students. The authors describe this as a “continuum” (from law enforcement at one end and mentoring/teaching at the other) since some schools emphasize certain aspects over others.

Overall, interviews with stakeholders and focus groups with students found that the program is perceived to be helpful and beneficial, with many students and families reporting they feel safer with the SRO program. However, a major limitation with this study is that the sites selected were those that “seemed to be functioning well,” and may be disproportionately more successful than others.


The authors discuss the comprehensive service school (CSS) as a promising strategy to provide interagency services to at-risk youth and their families. They discuss the collaborative process, describe potential challenges, and provide key recommendations for successfully implementing and maintaining a CSS.
Family-Based Interventions


This article provides a meta-analysis of crime/delinquency prevention programs that focus on the family and had strong evaluation methodologies. While most of the programs reviewed had positive impacts on delinquency, the authors highlight a few programs and particularly effective, including those who utilize behavioral parental training, home visitation programs, and multi-systemic therapy.


This chapter focuses on risk and protective factors from longitudinal studies on violence and serious crime to synthesize effective predictors of violence. Several charts display summary information on the studies they considered, although the section on family risk factor studies was the section primarily used for the purposes of this literature review.


This article evaluates the delinquency levels and substance use behaviors of the siblings of juvenile drug court participants that experienced additional, evidence-based treatment programs. They found that the siblings had “parallel” outcomes for substance abuse, but not criminal behaviors. The authors propose that the behavioral parental components of the effective treatment programs implemented (such as multi-systemic therapy) had both indirect and direct impacts on these siblings.


In a report written for the National Institute of Justice (and requested from Congress), the authors reviewed over 500 program impact evaluations to determine which programs are effective in reducing youth violence and crime. While there were a variety of findings (some work, some are promising, and others need more research), the authors recommend targeting areas with high concentrations of poverty and violence.
This article considers past studies on preventing delinquent behavior and targeting risk factors. Findings indicate more than one risk factor should be targeted, and programs that address certain parental practices, such as antisocial parents or inconsistent punishment practices, are typically effective.

**Children At Risk (CAR) Program**


The Children at Risk (CAR) program is a comprehensive, neighborhood-based initiative to prevent drug use, delinquency, and other problem behaviors for high-risk youth in high-risk neighborhoods. CAR has eight required service delivery components to address neighborhood, peer, family, and individual risk factors, and criminal justice agencies collaborate with case managers and school staff to provide these comprehensive services. CAR also connects to community policing and problem-solving partnerships as a strategy to increase public safety and reduce drug trafficking, gang violence, and related crimes.

The first report (volume I) reports the impact of CAR on youth, caregivers, and neighborhoods after two years of program implementation. The second report (volume II) reports the impact of CAR on individual youth after one year of program implementation. Quasi-experimental methods are used, and a main limitation is that dosage (or levels of treatment) could not be measured for individual clients.

Results from Volume I found that compared to control youth in similar neighborhoods without exposure to the program, CAR youth were less likely to have used drugs or be using drugs at the end of the program—but not at the end of the demonstration period. Although CAR youth/families participated in more positive activities, they did not have significantly lower criminal activity or problem behaviors. While CAR may have reduced risk factors and increased protective factors, the gains were small. At the neighborhood level, CAR neighborhoods weren’t ranked safer or better than others. While police were not reported to be more visible in CAR neighborhoods than comparison sites, residents in CAR areas knew officers’ names and had more friendly contact with police at higher rates. Results from Volume II found that overall, CAR youth were less likely to use gateway drugs (in the past month and past year) or stronger drugs (in the past month), to sell drugs in the past month (and in their lifetimes), and to be involved in violent crime. CAR youth also had improved school performance and improved peer group influences and interactions.
This brief summarizes the Children at Risk (CAR) drug and delinquency prevention program, including the key evaluation questions and evaluation results. Results indicate that CAR youth had an increased participation in services and activities, and more CAR households reported receiving services than households in the control group, but many CAR households still needed (and did not receive) core services. CAR youth also reported more positive peer interactions and were less likely to use or sell drugs and be engaged in violent crimes within the 12 month period after the program compared to control group youth.

**Mentoring**


This report reviews youth development outcomes from a three year timeframe of the Boys and Girls Club program. Using youth surveys (n= 320), program attendance records, and in-depth interviews with a sample of youth, the authors found that those who participated at higher levels in BGCA had positive improvements in school (such as skipping school less and increased academic confidence) and were less likely to begin carrying weapons or use drugs or marijuana.


This report describes the process for selecting 10 model programs designed to address violence prevention out of over 400 potential programs. It discusses who the Big Brothers Big Sisters of America program targets, goals of the program, and presents results (mainly that program participants were less likely to use alcohol or drugs, had better academic performance, had stronger relationships with parents and peers, and had a smaller likelihood of hitting someone than non-participants). Specifically, randomly assigned youth who received BBBSA services over an 18-month period were less likely to begin using drugs or alcohol or to hit someone, had positive school outcomes (such as attending class more and earning better grades), and had improved relationships with family and peers compared to youth who did not have BBBSA services.

**Partnership and Collaboration**

These two reports offer a synthesis of information on community agency capacity to partner for intervention strategies designed to prevent crime. Specifically, the authors of the 2002 report find that community organizations must be able to leverage outside resources, collaborations are critical to success, and lead agencies need to understand the community’s needs and respond appropriately. The study then looks closely at specific components of capacity.

The 2002 report also provides a conceptual framework for community justice partnership processes. Main elements of the framework include member characteristics that influence partnership characteristics; partnership characteristics related to outcomes; goals, problem domains, and objectives; activities; and community-level, family-level, community-level, and systems-level outcomes. There are three main organizational characteristics that are influential for the capacity for organizations to be significant contributors to an intervention program: leadership, resources, and orientation. In addition, partnerships are more likely to succeed when the community understands what is being targeted, there is partnership commitment, goals and intentions are clear, communication across agencies occurs, there is equal decision making among partners, a thorough needs assessment is conducted, horizontal and vertical integration exists, and successes are publicized. In the 2006 follow-up, findings from a study to collect data on effective partnerships are presented, as is a detailed conceptual framework to assess and evaluate partnerships, including process, intermediate, and end outcomes.

This article is about the theory, measurement, and evaluation of partnerships. Rosenbaum advocates for the partnership model, which applies new perspectives and approaches from multiple agencies, to increase the effect of intervention (both quality and quantity). Partners can be from an array of areas, but need problem solving strategies on the inside and resources from the outside. He argues that complex and multi-faceted approaches have worked in other areas (such as substance abuse or health care), and should be applied to CJ interventions.

He finds several things work in intervention programs, including: horizontal and vertical integration (across various organizations and at the individual/family/community levels) and community representation at the table (especially for suppression, otherwise the community might resent the program’s efforts). Also, depending on the variance in outcome measures, programs might want a single causal mechanism across multiple domains or one domain with numerous causal mechanisms.

This book is one of the seminal texts of urban planning. Written at a time of great social upheaval and as a response to the top-down, oversized planning process in the development of the interstate system connections through New York City, the book argues for a more balanced, less car-centric and more human-centric approach. The author is a sharp-eyed observer of urban life, and relates the everyday life of city dwellers and neighborhoods to the consequences of urban planning. The book emphasizes the importance of two factors in maintaining the social capital of place: neighborhood diversity that empowers resident movement within the neighborhood as their needs change; and welcoming spaces for casual interaction to encourage safety, commerce, and the social fabric.


This article discusses the participation of rehabilitation counselors, or counselors for students with disabilities, in the coordinated service process. Coordinating student services is viewed as an interagency and multi-disciplinary process, and incorporating rehabilitation counselors is viewed by the authors as critical. In their study, which surveyed educators and rehabilitation counselors, they found that this role is not properly incorporated into the service process, and provide recommendations for increasing collaborations.


This article discusses collaborations between schools and Vocational Rehabilitation Agencies, especially when considering students’ transitions from school to the community. Based on a larger study, this piece discusses some of the challenges discovered through Project REFER (Referral and Evaluation procedures For Education and Rehabilitation).


This article explores the prevalence and determinants of collaboration during contract monitoring, which is on the rise as policymakers and scholars increasingly view collaboration as an imperative. Amirkhanyan interviewed state and local contract managers, as well as nonprofit and for-profit contractors. Qualitative analysis identified common collaborative strategies used by agencies and vendors. Regressions found that
contractors with unique expertise and greater resources were more likely to collaborate. Counter-intuitively, governments with greater in-house expertise were also more likely to collaborate on contract monitoring, explained perhaps by their greater capacity for oversight. The relationship between monitoring officers and vendors is complex and symbiotic; it is a continuum rather than a duality. This continuum extends to the contracting process itself, which the author argues should be seen as more than a choice between less formal relational contracts and more formal transactional contracting. Ultimately, collaboration is an individual level process.


This article focuses on public private coalitions of service delivery networks. The goal of the paper is to identify the continuum of collaborative activities engaged in by community health partnerships and the factors which affect them. The authors describe the changing structure of partnership and health provision in the late nineties following the failure of healthcare reform during President Clinton’s first term. Data was collected about 283 applicants to the community Care Network demonstration program around three questions: the dimensions of their collaborative activity; their level of activity in each dimensions; and the effect of partnership features and context on collaborative activity. The authors found seven types of collaborative activity. Willingness to engage in the seven activities was correlated with perceived benefits to each member. Market and service provider characteristics were also found to be important to acting collaboratively.


Using data from the Investigating Partnerships in Early Childhood Education Study, the authors examine how early child care collaborations function and their effect impact on clients and the organizations themselves. They find that greater collaboration is positively and significantly correlated with staff compensation, staff turnover, and school readiness.


The *Handbook* is intended to be a resource for local education agencies to assist them in developing and evaluating local collaborations. It builds on the work of the last twenty years of interagency collaboration across many disciplines, including an extensive historical overview and literature review on interagency collaboration in general and in California specifically. The authors of the handbook define interagency collaboration as
“a process by which representatives from various agencies come together to identify and work toward a common goal” and identify three key features: problems and solutions are shared across agencies; objectives by the group are met through consensus building; funding sources, training, personnel, and program philosophies are blended.

The authors of the *Handbook* close with eight recommendations for agencies thinking about or already collaborating: maintaining the interagency culture, fostering effective communication between team members, promoting open dialogue about agency roles and expectations rooted in common goals, holding meetings and events regularly, brainstorming to solve problems, rotating responsibilities among agency representatives, utilizing existing models, and promoting mutual trust and respect.


Bruner argues that collaboration will only succeed if it changes the fragmented nature of the relationship between service providers and clients and sets as its goal the alleviation of real needs. Using a “question and answer” format, the author discusses the role of the state, strategies for local collaboration, the role of the private sector, collaboration between agency and client, and the possible negative consequences of collaboration. Checklists are provided to help agencies think through their own evolving collaborative, providing guidance for each stage in the process. Bruner closes with seven key points: collaboration is not a quick fix; it is a means to an end, not the end itself; developing interagency collaboration is time-consuming and process-intensive; simply collaborating does not guarantee success; collaboration occurs between people, not institutions; collaboration rewards creativity; and collaboration must be more than symbolic.


This article identifies critical issues for stakeholders to consider when designing accountability systems in the context of federal interest in results-oriented governance and performance-based budgeting. The authors use the field of early interventions and early childhood special education services as a backdrop to discuss broader issues around accountability systems. Early interventions and early childhood special education services is a complex field which the authors attempt to simplify for the reader; in particular they highlight the internal confusion surrounding what is a standard and what is an outcome, and the multiple levels of measurement and accountability. The authors provide specific tools for agencies and stakeholders to walk through the development process for accountability systems, providing examples along the way.

**Collective Efficacy**

This brief describes collective efficacy in the school environment. The authors argue that increased collaboration and sharing knowledge and resources has the potential to improve student performance, strengthen teachers’ commitment, and build parent/teacher relationships.


This work expands social disorganization theory and the concept of collective efficacy to a partner violence study. Combining census, community survey, homicide and health and social life data, Browning finds that higher collective efficacy is linked to lower violence and homicide rates among partners. He concludes that the norms, attitudes, and tolerance levels about partner violence in neighborhoods impact these issues.


These authors test a theory that attempts to explain both collective efficacy and social networks. Browning et al. assert that although social networks impact collective efficacy, social networking may also apply to offenders (and thus increase crime and delinquency in an area). Using census, city homicide, and community survey data, these researchers found that when controlling for the effects of collective efficacy, networks had a significantly positive relationship to victimization, but the interaction effect between networks and collective efficacy was also positive (indicating a reduction of the negative aspect of collective efficacy).


This study considers two issues in relation to neighborhood-level homicide rates: spatial proximity to homicide risk and social processes. Using police records, census data, and a survey of Chicago residents, the authors examine 343 neighborhoods. Findings suggest closer proximity to homicide risk is related to high homicide rates and low collective efficacy and concentrated disadvantage are linked to higher homicide rates. The authors note that collective efficacy impacts informal networks for developing social control.


In this piece, the authors systematically record signs of public decay for 196 neighborhoods in Chicago. Compiling these data with census data, police records, and a
community survey (of over 3,500 residents), the authors test a theory of collective efficacy. Even after accounting for the effects of neighborhood disorder (or broken windows theory), increased social cohesion is related to a reduction in violent crime rates, and may even be more influential than disorder when explaining crime.


This article is considered a classic background piece in the collective efficacy literature, and tests whether collective efficacy (which the authors define as “social cohesion among neighbors combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good”) is linked to reductions in violent crime. Using 1995 survey data (n=8782 residents; 343 neighborhoods), they find support that collective efficacy serves as a mediator for violence, with higher levels of collective efficacy corresponding to lower levels of violence.

**Miscellaneous Interventions**

**MARYLAND HOT SPOT INITIATIVE**


A state-wide initiative from 1996 to 2000, the Maryland HotSpots Communities program was implemented in 36 areas in Maryland. This evaluation found a 22 percent violent crime reduction in the hotspot areas compared to the rest of the state. Also see the Year 1 (2001) report for further information, although there were not significant differences in the recidivism rates in pre/post comparisons of probationers.

**THE NEUTRAL ZONE**


The Neutral Zone is intended to provide a neutral place where kids can congregate during times and days of the week when they are at most risk of being involved in crime (victimized by it or committing it). The program provides a wide range of activities (sports, music, movies, etc.) and free food, counseling, other essential services (job training, etc), appropriate adult role models, and general socialization.
An accountability evaluation consisted of focus groups, direct observation, and official police data (calls for service). Baseline data was unavailable, so a pre/post study could not be conducted. Results found that there were statistically significant increases in calls for service on weekends the program was closed, and the authors conclude that the program is cost effective (due mainly to the volunteer staff and donated resources).

**Comprehensive Community Initiatives**


This book is a compilation of chapters from different authors with the common theme of connections between families, individuals, and the communities in which they live. Select chapters were referenced for the human services literature review. Sampson (chapter 1) discusses neighborhood social organization as a theoretical way to understand “neighborhood effects” on individuals and families, and finds that diversity does not limit the capacity of a community, structural differentials exist, and vertical integration is important. In Korbin’s chapter on neighborhood studies, she finds that adult intervention (or the ability to impact negative behaviors in the neighborhood), having neighborhood resources, and stable residency in the area are important indicators connecting families or individuals to communities.

Duncan and Raudenbush provide a chapter on the methodological issues behind neighborhood effects, including measures, unobserved factors or issues, and sampling considerations, and Burton discusses how economically disadvantaged, high risk neighborhoods cannot traditionally be considered because important indicators or influences will not be captured in measurement and multiple contexts must be taken into account. Connell and Kubisch’s chapter reviews the tensions found in community-based initiatives, including people versus places interventions and goals, private versus public resources, top down versus bottom up leadership, deficit oriented versus asset oriented intervention strategies, focusing on specific problems versus multiple issues, and applying a specific technology versus capacity building. Connell and Kubisch also give an overview of comprehensive community initiatives (CCIs) and community development corporations (CDCs), including recommendations for improving the quality of life in place-based initiatives.


The authors of this book analyze data on community development corporations (CDCs) to determine the program impacts on neighborhood residents in three sites (Newark, New Jersey; Boston, Massachusetts; and Minneapolis, Minnesota). Using both qualitative and
quantitative methods, the authors find generally positive results regarding residents' perceptions of housing satisfaction, neighborhood safety, and community empowerment in these three CDC areas, although the three sites selected were noted for being successful prior to this assessment. The authors recommend that projects similar to the CDC effort focus on property management and give residents more formal, ongoing input in operations and strategy. Substantial investment is needed (including technical assistance, political will, and patience) when developing such large scale community development projects.


In this article, Chavis and Wandersman discuss the importance of community development and the role of sense of community in fostering individual actions for neighborhood improvement. They assert that a positive environment or a positive perception of the local environment will contribute to a greater sense of community, although problems in a community are sometimes so great that they inspire community action. The authors discuss how a greater social network or community relationship will result in greater numbers of actions taken to create community development action and is beneficial for organizations to have informal social control, or normative influences, on behavior. In addition, personal empowerment contributes to successful community development projects and positive relationships and perceptions of power or decision making capabilities results in a greater sense of community. The authors tested and found support for the following factors (in a positive manner) as contributing to neighborhood development: the perception of the environment, social relations, control and empowerment, and participation in neighborhood action.


This book chapter reviews how to evaluate Comprehensive Community Initiatives (CCIs), and the authors suggest urban interventions to positively influence determinants of social outcomes for youth. In their model, community dimensions (which include physical and demographic characteristics, economic opportunity structures, institutional capacities, and social exchange and symbolic processes), social mediators, and developmental processes influence one another and ultimately will produce specific desired outcomes. They note that from a human services perspective, the initial difficulty results in the institutional capacities, which are inherently underfunded and underdeveloped in poor communities. The authors measure three desired outcomes – economic self sufficiency, healthy family and social relationships, and good citizenship practices. Although the youth in this study are between ages 9-15, the authors suggest a need to address adults as importance influences, and external support is needed to build
shared values, reclaim authority from gangs, and overhaul deficits in institutional capacity. Improving the competency of adults and bodies such as schools are also recommended. Connell et al. suggest the following intervention areas as contributing to the positive development of youth: developing a greater knowledge of the community, deepening the experiences and interactions adults have with community youth, and increasing the support other adults are giving one another (with examples of measurable programs listed in the chapter).


This chapter discusses the challenges in measuring the variations in well-being of children across local communities, citing the local community as having definitional issues, but including political divisions (such as wards), statistical definitions (census tracts), methods of mapping interactions, and perceived networks of social cohesion or shared institutions. Coulton describes two orientations from which to interpret well-being indicators, which often overlap or are not able to be clearly separated: outcome orientations (which look at the community as a unit and measurable against other units or communities) and contextual orientations (including economic status, family structures, residential mobility, and environmental stresses). She notes the difficulties in actually measuring these indicators, but suggests they are still relied upon to show growth, changes, and comparisons. Involvement of local leaders and administrative agencies can supplement the data but fleshing out a data point or even by defining boundaries of a community.


This article is a literature review of the community collaboration field. The authors provide a qualitative analysis of approximately 80 articles and reports in order to develop a framework that captures what makes a successful community coalition. Four capacities are reviewed in a checklist like manner: member, relational, organizational, and programmatic capacities. **Member capacity** must be dynamic, adjustable, and transferable, and members need to ascertain certain skills, including the knowledge of how to work collaboratively, as well as how to create effective programming and sustain a created infrastructure. Positive attitudes contribute to greater capacity, including understanding the need for collaboration, the benefits of participation, commitment to the problem, relationships with other stakeholders, and views of themselves. Community collaborations can build member capacity through diversity, valuing of technical skills, and inclusion of a community members.
For *relational capacity*, success depends on the manner in which broader networks are connections and interact, so there is a need for a community coalition to have both internal and external relationships to be successful. This has the potential for difficulty, as organization members may have had past conflicts. However, creating a positive climate, gathering around a shared vision, and sharing decision making powers prove successful in building relational capacity. As for external partners, it is important to reach out to organizational sectors, community residents, key leaders, and other similar groups.

To develop a successful plan with *organizational capacity*, a coalition needs a strong set of leaders, formalized procedures and processes, a communication system, proper resources, and the flexibility to incorporate feedback determined during evaluation. Finally, in *programmatic capacity*, focused objectives and realistic approaches to the subject are required.


This roundtable paper describes the positive and negative experiences of communities (based on accounts from community-based organizations) involved in partnerships, advantages for short and long-term change, and what factors appear to influence effectiveness. Findings include a need for the direct involvement of an institution’s upper management; understanding the challenges involved in coordinating with multiple partners; acknowledging that sustainability relies upon the institutions, not the communities; a need for targeted funding; and the inability to change the practices of “anchor institutions” (or agencies in the community that are heavily invested and unlikely to leave) to alter their internal operational practices in ways that can benefit community development.


This guidebook was written for community agencies looking to implement a Communities that Care program. The guide describes the program, explains the advantages in mobilizing the community, provides an overview on risk and protective factors and effective programs that exist, and provides some implementation material (such as a step-by-step milestone chart and timeline for the planning phases).


This toolkit offers CCI related resources to federal workers. The site contains describes the basic components of a CCI, provides tools to help develop and manage a CCI, as well as some technical assistance resources.
In this article, the author provides background on the adoption of the CCI model and discusses lessons learned from CCI projects underway in the mid-1990s. Specifically, he discusses the relationship between foundations and communities; the importance of enlisting experts to evaluate CCIs; adjusting to political tensions that may exist in the community; receiving technical assistance; promoting leaders with a background in community development for the CCI; and ensuring partnership participation in external evaluations.

The second part in this article discusses the importance of comprehensive planning; the shifting way communities must interact with systems, agencies, and individuals to become a sustainable CCI; collaboration with a large variety of community participants; developing a strong leadership structure or incorporating the CCI into an existing structure; and maintaining community participation and adequate staffing in the CCI.

This paper is a response to Aspen’s Voices from the Field II and begins by defining community building and civic capacity. Saegert discusses the belief that community building increases social capital and shared community agendas, which then results in an increase in civic capacity. Community building can be interpreted in two different ways – deciding whether to change the entire community or determining the appropriate distribution of resources among a community. Saegert discusses different successful strategies for community building, including the consensus model, the network strategy, and collective ownership, all of which, depending on the place and scale, have positive outcomes.

**Multi-site CCIs**


CCP is a collaborative approach designed to reduce crime and increase public safety. This bulletin describes the program and summarizes findings from a national evaluation. Results indicate that while there are a variety of site-specific program components in CCP sites (such as drug courts or anti-gang initiatives), all of them rely heavily on community policing and community mobilization through a problem-solving partnership strategy. Core elements of CCP are: data-driven strategic planning by multiple agencies and community representatives, a clear program management and operation structure, process and outcome evaluations, and sustainment plans. Strong commitment to the partnership, accountability, a variety of perspectives (by including various stakeholders in discussions), shared problem solving, and being open to new strategies were important to success for the fifteen CCP sites assessed.


These reports discuss Annie E. Casey’s seven-year project called the Rebuilding Communities Initiative (RCI), which focused on improving the well-being of children and families and enhancing organizations, institutions, and social relationships (or a system’s change approach). RCI depends on community engagement and partnerships to obtain adequate resources, and a “top down” approach to managing the program is discouraged for this holistic initiative. RCI was implemented in five cities (Boston, Philadelphia, Washington, Denver and Detroit), and broader lessons learned from the RCIs are discussed in these reports.

**SINGLE-SITE CCIS**


This study evaluates the Second Step, a violence prevention curriculum in Washington State that focused on empathy training, impulse control, and anger management. Although the follow-up window was short (two weeks after program completion), findings indicated that children in the program exhibited a decrease in aggression and
anti-social behavior. Time of year to implement school programming may have implications as authors found aggression levels rose during the progression of the year.


This report is designed for practitioners looking to adopt the CCI model in their jurisdiction, and has summary information on 10 initiatives across the country (including operational practices, funding, partnerships, individual and community-level impacts, and recommendations). Although not a formal evaluation (and not intended for comparisons across sites), the authors report findings on eight main topics: community building, economic development, education, employment and training, healthcare, housing, social services, and youth. Programs offered in CCIs typically varied based on seven factors: available funding; existing community assets; community needs; the size of the target community; how established or mature CCI organizations were; other public and private programs operating in the community; and the goals/objectives developed by neighborhood residents and organizations.


These sources review guiding principles in the Comprehensive Community Revitalization Program (CCRP), including planning strategies that account for the neighborhood’s visions, managing and leveraging resources, economic development, developing leadership, and expanding and strengthening partnerships. Strengths of the program included a practical strategy, reliance on existing CDCs, a comprehensive focus in a targeted and narrow implementation area, obtaining external technical assistance, having formal partnership agreements with community organizations, having flexible funding from sources, building community capacity, participating in an external evaluation, and engaging the community.

**BEST PRACTICES AND EVALUATION STRATEGIES**

This book has two primary purposes: explaining what is known about the CCI evaluation process and proposing ways to improve the evidence of their effectiveness. To do so, the authors examine ten programs that are place-based, comprehensive, and operate according to community building principles. Troubled areas of evaluation include horizontal complexity, vertical complexity, community building, contextual issues, community responsiveness and flexibility over time, and community saturation. The strength of the evaluation typically increases when both CCIs and evaluations are multidisciplinary/involve multiple fields (public health, housing, safety, etc.). The overall conclusion is that evaluations should be approached in a more scientific or technical manner, and by integrating evaluators into the development process, experiential and valuable knowledge can be shared.


The Blueprints project systematically reviews work on violence and drug abuse programs to determine which are the most effective (or “model programs”), most promising, and the strength of the methodologies used in prior research. Highlighted best practices include Functional Family Therapy, Incredible Years Series, Life Skills training, Nurse-Family partnership, Multisystemic therapy, and the Midwestern prevention project.


This book updates the first volume published and addresses issues of evaluation in comprehensive community initiatives. Authors identify approaches to evaluating CCIs as well as recounting the benefits and challenges of such evaluations. Data sources were central to the challenges of measuring CCIs, because of their unique scale, community context, and inability to attribute causality.


This newsletter introduces results based accountability (RBA) and provides examples from state level programming. RBA programs are complex, differ greatly, and must be context-based. One article in this issue focuses on the lessons learn from implementation, and another reports interview results from two people closely associated with the federal implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act (1993).

Voices from the Field II builds on its predecessor, integrating on the ground experiences to the more theoretical first edition. The book is a result of a roundtable of 63 community change practitioners to develop principles to guide action and centralize the growing field of CCI knowledge. Authors argue that CCIs will continue to improve with strengthened evaluations. Kubisch et al. also discuss the importance of community capacity in CCIs, defining the concept and brainstorming effective and sustainable ways to achieve increased community capacity. The authors also develop the ecology of change, reminding their audience that comprehensive community change is greater than change for residents. Practitioners must also address change among community institutions, foundational partners, and regulating policy.


*Voices from the Field III* is the most up to date portrait on community change and CCIs, reflecting the last ten years of progress in the field. One of the most important developments for CCIs is greater access to institutional funding and support networks. The report builds upon the previous two reports in many ways, but also introduces three increasingly relevant issues. First, the scope of most CCIs is overestimated. CCIs bring about individual-level changes, but rarely changes that are seen at the population level. In the past, CCIs have set goals that are too broad or comprehensive to achieve. Additionally, it takes a tremendous amount of resources, social capital, and political will to initiate community change. Thus, it is important to plan realistic goals with existing community capacity and not to underestimate the length of time that it will take for community change to root. Finally, the field has come to the conclusion that, partly due to the number of moving parts, a CCI evaluation cannot explain casualty between a CCI and outcomes. Evaluations are still important, but rather, they should focus on documenting the contributions of CCI activities to the community. Evaluations should occur frequently so that feedback can be incorporated in real time to initiatives, when it is most useful.


In this report, the authors argue that it is important to understand the dynamics that influence comprehensive community initiatives (CCIs) before you can understand or interpret the outcomes. There are two central principles to CCIs (comprehensiveness and community building), and examining CCIs requires an understanding of the operational strategies, including the governance, funding, staffing, technical assistance, evaluation, and program development. The authors discuss the difficulties in evaluating CCIs and
stress the importance of the process that a community undertakes and thus develops out of as greater than the outcomes of an initiative. Capacity to build community is thought to be demonstrated by examples such as full community meetings, not results of physical construction. Kubisch et al. find that there are five key components of success: comprehensive, organic community leadership; clear communication; technical assistance that is beneficial but not divisive; consensus on the need to include neighborhood residents on governance boards; and a focus on the process, not the product.


This research brief discusses lessons learned from eight states that have designed and implemented results-based accountability (RBA) to improve child and family services. The author notes that it can be difficult for RBA to work across agencies that have different practices (e.g., budgets or timelines), but requesting data is a way to ensure accountability and test outcomes. Recommended practices for implementing RBAs include: setting realistic expectations; engaging various types of stakeholders to determine problems/solutions; training managers, service providers, and residents about the process; designing reports; creating systems for a smoother process; and acquiring community support.